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Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New
Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. We estimate credibility for
the U.S. Federal Reserve with Bayesian methods exploiting survey data on interest rate
expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide
important takeaways: (1) The estimate of Federal Reserve credibility in terms of for-
ward guidance announcements is relatively high, which indicates a degree of forward
guidance effectiveness, but still one that is below the fully credible case. Hence, antic-
ipation effects are attenuated and, accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as
favorably to forward guidance announcements. (2) Imperfect central bank credibility
is an important feature to resolve the so-called “forward guidance puzzle,”which the
literature shows arises from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic vari-
ables to forward guidance statements in structural models with perfect credibility. (3)
Imperfect monetary authority credibility can also explain the evidence of forecasting
error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus,
accounting for imperfect credibility is important to model the formation of expectations
in the economy and to understand the transmission mechanism of forward guidance
announcements.
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Abstract
Este documento examina la efectividad de los preanuncios de política monetaria
en un modelo Neo-Keynesiano estimado con credibilidad imperfecta del banco central.
Estimamos la credibilidad de la Reserva Federal de los EE.UU. con métodos bayesianos
explotando los datos sobre expectativas de tasas de interés del Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). Los resultados revelan importantes conclusiones: (1) La estimación
de la credibilidad de la Reserva Federal en referencia a los preanuncios de política
monetaria es relativamente alta, lo que indica un alto grado de efectividad de los pre-
anuncios monetarios, pero ciertamente menor que el que cabría esperar en el caso de
que estos fueran enteramente creíbles. Por lo tanto, los efectos de anticipación se
atenúan y, en consecuencia, el producto y la inflación no responden tan favorablemente
a los preanuncios de la política monetaria futura. (2) La credibilidad imperfecta de los
preanuncios de política monetaria es un aspecto importante para resolver la llamada
“paradoja de los preanuncios monetarios”, que la literatura muestra que surge de las
respuestas poco realistas de las variables macroeconómicas a los preanuncios monetar-
ios en modelos estructurales con credibilidad perfecta. (3) Credibilidad imperfecta de
la autoridad monetaria puede también explicar la evidencia sobre la previsibilidad de
los errores de pronóstico basada en el desacuerdo entre pronosticadores que documen-
tamos en los datos del SPF. Por lo tanto, tener en cuenta la credibilidad imperfecta es
importante para modelar la formación de expectativas en la economía así como para
comprender el mecanismo de transmisión de los preanuncios monetarios.
Códigos de clasificación JEL: D84, E30, E50, E52, E58, E60
Palabras clave: Preanuncios Monetarios, Política Monetaria, Expectativas, Credi-
bilidad del Banco Central.
1 Introduction
Since the 2007 − 2009 financial recession, central bank forward guidance has been an es-
sential monetary policy tool. For instance, when short-term interest rates reached the zero
lower bound (ZLB) in the aftermath of the financial recession, the U.S. Federal Reserve
provided guidance on the future course of interest rates. The Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) first implemented forward guidance in their December 2008 statement: “the
Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.”This type of lower-for-longer policy is
predicted to have beneficial effects on the economy as described by Eggertsson and Wood-
ford (2003) and Woodford (2003). In addition, when interest rates are away from the ZLB,
forward guidance can provide clarification and transparency about future monetary policy.
As explained by Williams (2013), greater clarity about the future policy path from forward
guidance can help households and businesses make better investment decisions and boost
the economy.
The effectiveness of forward guidance, however, rests on the perceived credibility of the
central bank to follow through with its statements. Standard macroeconomic models often
consider the case of a fully credible monetary authority. However, this assumption ignores a
key channel through which forward guidance can affect the economy. If the central bank is
perceived as trustworthy, agents are likely to internalize how future statements about policy
affect their decisions today. If not, the effect on the economy from forward guidance is not
as strong. Indeed, Goodfriend and King (2016) recognize this stating that “forecasts, and
policy, should not be based solely on forecasts from a model that assumes full credibility in
the stated policy path.”Thus, it is important to examine how the effectiveness of forward
guidance depends on the credibility of the central bank.
This paper studies the effects of forward guidance with imperfect central bank credibility.
A standard New Keynesian model augmented with standard macroeconomic persistence fea-
tures (that is, with price stickiness, price indexation, habit formation, and interest rate iner-
tia) is employed. Following Del Negro et al. (2012) and Laséen and Svensson (2011), forward
guidance is implemented by adding anticipated or forward guidance shocks to the monetary
policy rule. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods with data on expectations–
including interest rate expectations– from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
Private agents that believe the central bank announcements about forward guidance are
assumed to follow the full-information rational expectations (FIRE) typically employed in
the literature. Those agents who do not believe central bank announcements about forward
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guidance, instead, form forecasts based on a data-driven VAR(1) in output, inflation, and
interest rates which effectively disregards all forward guidance announcements and only
responds to the policy announced when it materializes.1 A key parameter in our analysis
is 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, which defines the weight assigned by private agents to the belief that the
monetary authority forward guidance commitments are credible and would be honored. If
τ → 1, private agents believe the central bank to be perfectly credible and all announcements
about forward guidance to be honored. Thus, in that limiting case, aggregate expectations
follow FIRE and we are back in the standard setup in the literature (e.g., Del Negro et al.
(2012)). If τ → 0, agents do not perceive the monetary authority to be credible and ignore
forward guidance statements altogether. Aggregate expectations then do not contain forward
guidance information and private agents do not react to it.
The results from our estimated model show a number of takeaways. First, a distinctive
contribution of our paper regards our use of Bayesian estimation procedures and the SPF
dataset to estimate the degree of central bank credibility in regards to forward guidance.
We utilize expectations of the interest rate and other macro aggregates from the SPF to
help identify forward guidance shocks. The estimate of the credibility parameter (i.e., τ) in
terms of forward guidance announcements hovers around 0.8. Since the U.S. central bank is
perceived as less than fully credible in its forward guidance announcements, there exists less
immediate and overall anticipation effects on the economy from forward guidance than under
the perfectly credible case. The impulse response functions and variance decomposition
results in this paper show that the responses of output and inflation to forward guidance
shocks do not respond as favorably relative to the scenario of a perfectly credible central
bank.
Second, we also show that imperfect credibility is another important feature that can
contribute to resolve the so-called “forward guidance puzzle”. Del Negro et al. (2012) explain
that the forward guidance puzzle arises because standard New Keynesian models produce
unusually large responses to forward guidance news. The credibility estimate indeed is
below the fully credible case and this dampens the power of forward guidance. Our evidence
suggests that the attenuation that results from a forward guidance policy that is imperfectly
credible can go a long ways in reconciling the standard New Keynesian workhorse model
1The structure of the model borrows from the axiomatic approach of Branch and McGough (2009) to
represent aggregate expectations as a weighted sum of heterogenous private sector forecasts. The Appendix
suggests that the mixture of forecasting strategies in the aggregate expectations can arise as an equilibrium
from an evolutionary game-theoretic setup when incorporating central bank credibility and forward guidance.
This offers an alternative take on the formation of expectations which highlights the importance of non-
cooperative games between the central bank and the private sector in our understanding of expectations.
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with the empirical evidence that points out more modest effects of forward guidance.
Third, we provide (compelling) evidence that our model captures central bank credibility
in terms of forward guidance and aligns well with the data. For instance, the estimate of the
monetary authority credibility parameter τ appears robust. The estimate of τ is similar to
the benchmark results when we consider alternative forecasting models for those agents who
do not believe forward guidance statements. The estimate of τ does not noticeably change
when habits in consumption or price indexation are turned off. In addition, the model of
imperfect central bank credibility cross-validates well with other important features of the
SPF data– in particular, with the predictability of forecasting errors based on forecasting
disagreements. In both simulated data from our model and in the SPF data, we compare
the empirical relationship between forecast errors and forecast disagreements with a stan-
dard regression. Our model of imperfect credibility can display comovements between the
previously mentioned variables at different horizons that are broadly consistent with the
comovements implied by the SPF dataset. In contrast, the perfectly credible central bank
scenario (i.e., τ = 1) cannot capture those features of the SPF data.
Finally, we then examine additional alternative estimation strategies as a further robust-
ness check. First, the main results do not substantially change if the model is estimated over
our full sample (1981 : Q3 − 2018 : Q4), the non-ZLB subsample (1981 : Q3 − 2008 : Q4),
or the Great Moderation period (1985 : Q1 − 2007 : Q3). In particular, the estimate of τ
is high indicating a high level of trust in the central bank, but still below the fully credible
case and similar to our baseline estimate for the full sample. Second, our results are largely
robust to a more agnostic prior belief about τ . The prior distribution in the baseline exercise
was centered around a high degree of central bank credibility. When a more agnostic prior
belief is assumed, our estimate of τ does not noticeably change in relation to the benchmark
case. Third, the results are robust if t+ 1 expectations correspond to the one-period ahead
forecasts in the SPF instead of corresponding to the nowcast as in our benchmark mapping
between the data and the model.
In summary, by using Bayesian estimation procedures and SPF expectations data, we
provide an estimate of the U.S. Federal Reserve credibility in relation to forward guidance.
While we obtain a high level of central bank credibility from our evidence, the Federal
Reserve is perceived as less than fully credible. Thus, our paper shows that accounting for
imperfect credibility is important to model the formation of expectations in the economy
and particularly so for the transmission mechanism of forward guidance announcements.
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1.1 Contribution to the Literature
There exists a growing strand of the monetary policy literature focused on the transmis-
sion mechanism through which forward guidance is thought to operate. This transmission
channel relies on anticipation effects driven by a credible commitment to future policy. The
evidence suggests that forward guidance moves expectations but only partially (Ferrero and
Secchi (2009); Ferrero and Secchi (2010); Hubert (2014); Hubert (2015a); Hubert (2015b)).
Mainstream theory suggests that the anticipation effects are simply too strong within the
standard class of general equilibrium models to be consistent with the empirical evidence
(the so-called “forward guidance puzzle”of Del Negro et al. (2012)).2
Some authors like McKay et al. (2016) have argued that capital market imperfections
can be part of the story. Other papers have analyzed the expectations formation process
of agents. Gauss (2015) and Andrade et al. (2019) show that heterogenous expectations in
an economy can influence the power of forward guidance. Cole (2020a) and Cole (2020b)
explain that the rational expectations assumption can overstate the benefits of forward
guidance relative to a more realistic adaptive learning rule.
The effectiveness of forward guidance has also been analyzed via the communications
channel. Campbell et al. (2019) find that FOMC forward guidance information has limited
power at long horizons. De Graeve et al. (2014) argue that the effects of forward guidance
on the economy can have more positive effects if its length is tied to the future condition of
the economy (threshold-based forward guidance).3
The present paper is also related to prior research exploring the conduct of monetary pol-
icy when agents have imperfect information about the economy. Under an adaptive learning
framework in which agents are uncertain about the true structure of the economy, Eusepi
and Preston (2010) analyze different monetary policy communication strategies to ensure
stable macroeconomic dynamics. Honkapohja and Mitra (2019) study central bank credibil-
ity in an adaptive learning framework when the monetary authority implements a price-level
targeting policy. Ferrero and Secchi (2009) and Ferrero and Secchi (2010) show that if the
central bank communicates to the public its projections of the output gap and inflation,
more desirable and stable outcomes can occur in the economy. Orphanides and Williams
(2004), Orphanides and Williams (2007), Gaspar et al. (2006), and Gaspar et al. (2010)
2Carlstrom et al. (2015) also show unusually large responses of the macroeconomic variables to interest
rate pegs under a perfectly credible central bank.
3Campbell et al. (2012) also examine Odyssean forward guidance (commitment to a future path of the
policy rate) and Delphic forward guidance (publication of the central bank’s own forecasts) in the U.S and
find that the FOMC has achieved some success in communicating Odyssean forward guidance.
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study central bank behavior when agents have imperfect information about the parameters
in the central bank’s policy rule function or optimal monetary policy with adaptive learning.
Our paper is closest to Haberis et al. (2014), Goy et al. (2018), and Haberis et al. (2019)
which also look at the role of monetary policy credibility.4 The former shows that forward
guidance can help escape the liquidity trap when central bank credibility is endogenous.
The latter paper explains that interest rate pegs can produce more muted responses of the
macroeconomic variables if agents in their model are allowed to perceive the central bank as
not credible.5
Altogether we see our paper adding to the literature along the following dimensions: (1)
We explicitly model the perceived credibility of the policy commitment on the part of the
private agents tied to the formation of expectations. (2) We exploit SPF data on private
sector expectations and Bayesian estimation techniques to analyze the effects of central bank
credibility on the transmission of forward guidance shocks. Bayesian estimation procedures
and survey data are employed to recover an estimate of central bank credibility in relation to
forward guidance, which other studies have not estimated. None of the papers cited earlier
explicitly estimates forward guidance and credibility jointly in a model as is done in our study.
(3) The resulting outcomes from our estimation show a high but imperfectly credible central
bank in the U.S. This result implies that credibility has dampened the effects of forward
guidance on the economy relative to the perfectly credible central bank case. (4) To the
best of our knowledge, we are also the first paper to cross-validate a macroeconomic model
of central bank credibility and forward guidance on the forecastability of SPF forecasting
errors.
In short, we argue that both macro data and expectations data are better described with
a model that incorporates heterogeneous expectations and deviations from FIRE behavior
resulting from an environment where policy commitments about the future path of the
interest rate can be reneged by the central bank. Therefore, from our estimation, we conclude
that the anticipation effects of forward guidance in the U.S. are attenuated– at least in part–
because the central bank is perceived by private agents as unable to fully commit to honor
the announced future path.
The remainder of the paper goes as follows: In Section 2 we discuss our baseline model
with heterogenous expectations and central bank credibility. In Section 3 we introduce our
4Other papers related to ours include Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who also discuss the importance
of the management of expectations when the interest rate is constrained by the ZLB, and also Kiley (2016)
and Swanson (2018) who explore forward guidance at the ZLB.
5Nakata and Sunakawa (2019) and Dong and Young (2019) examine time consistent policy in a model
with forward guidance and credibility.
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Bayesian estimation approach which is based on an expectations-augmented linearized ver-
sion of the general equilibrium model. In Section 4 we present our main findings, while in
Section 5 we provide additional robustness checks on our key estimate of central bank credi-
bility. In Section 6 we conclude. We include in the Appendix an evolutionary game-theoretic
motivation of our notion of central bank credibility and its connection to heterogenous ex-
pectations as well as all listed tables and figures.
2 Benchmark Model
We employ a standard New Keynesian model that follows from the workhorse framework
laid out by Woodford (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2004), Milani (2007), Cúrdia et al.
(2015), and Cole and Milani (2017). The log-linear approximation that we bring to the
data is derived from the optimizing behavior of households and firms. Our variant of the
model includes four conventional sources of macroeconomic persistence– habit formation in
consumption, price stickiness, price indexation, and interest rate inertia– to capture the
dynamics of the macroeconomic data.
The model is completed with a Taylor (1993) interest rate feedback rule with inertia which
describes the response of monetary policy to domestic economic conditions. We augment
the standard monetary policy rule in one important dimension by explicitly distinguishing
between unanticipated (surprises) and anticipated (forward guidance) shocks to monetary
policy– a distinction that allows us to investigate the central bank’s commitment to a future
path of the nominal policy rate (forward guidance) through the lens of a general equilibrium
model. We describe the monetary policy rule in greater detail in Subsection 2.2.
We depart from the full-information rational expectations (FIRE), homogeneous-beliefs
paradigm embedded in the workhorse New Keynesian model.6 Private agents are modeled as
heterogeneous-beliefs rational households-firms that assign odds to whether the central bank
will honor its forward guidance commitments or not. If the central bank’s commitments
are deemed credible, then rational expectations forecasts are used. If they are deemed not
credible, then expectations are formed on the basis of standard VAR techniques used to fit the
data. VAR techniques are fairly easy to implement, yet are immune to attempts to “manage
expectations”on the part of the central bank through forward guidance announcements that
6Note that, as argued by Park (2018), monetary authorities typically employ macroeconomic models with
rational expectations to forecast future economic activity as well as the future path of inflation and the policy
rate– that is, models that do not incorporate the sort of heterogeneity that we capture here.
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can be reneged.7
2.1 Main Structural Relationships
As in Cúrdia et al. (2015), the workhorse New Keynesian model can be described by the
following pair of log-linearized equations:
x̃t = Etx̃t+1 − (1− βη) (1− η) (it − Etπt+1 − rnt ) , (1)
π̃t = βEtπ̃t+1 + ξp
(
ωxt + ((1− βη) (1− η))−1 x̃t
)
+ µt, (2)
where
ỹt ≡ yt − ηyt−1 − βηEt (yt+1 − ηyt) , (3)
ỹnt ≡ ynt − ηynt−1 − βηEt
(
ynt+1 − ηynt
)
, (4)
x̃t ≡ ỹt − ỹnt = xt − ηxt−1 − βηEt (xt+1 − ηxt) , (5)
π̃t ≡ πt − ιpπt−1. (6)
Here, the one-period nominal interest rate (it) is the policy rate, inflation (πt) is the first-
difference on the consumption price level in logs, and the output gap (xt) is defined as
xt ≡ yt− ynt , i.e., as the log-deviation of actual output (yt) from its potential level absent all
nominal rigidities (ynt ).
Equation (1), often referred to as the dynamic Investment-Savings (IS) equation, de-
scribes the aggregate demand of the economy arising from the optimal decisions (the in-
tertemporal Euler equation) of households. Equation (1) together with (3)− (5) implies that
the current output gap (xt) depends on expected one-period and two-period ahead output
gaps, the lagged output gap, the current nominal interest rate (it), the expected one-period
ahead inflation rate (Et (πt+1)), and the natural rate (rnt ) which is the real rate of interest
that would prevail absent all nominal rigidities. Here, the intertemporal rate of substitution
is set to one. There exists habit formation in consumption given by the parameter 0 ≤ η ≤ 1,
and households’intertemporal discount rate is given by the parameter 0 < β < 1.
Equation (2) denotes the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and follows from the
7A VAR model can be seen as a reduced-form representation of the solution to the rational expectations
model without forward guidance announcements (Martínez-García (2018)), but it is more flexible than using
the structural specification itself. This flexibility allows private agents to be agnostic about the policy rule
(not just the commitments about the future path) and to form their expectations solely on the basis of the
observed macro outcomes.
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optimizing decision of firms. These firms are owned by the households and are operated
in a monopolistically competitive environment with Calvo (1983) staggered price-setting
behavior and Yun (1996) price indexation, similar to Christiano et al. (2005). Consequently,
equation (2) shows that inflation (πt) depends on lagged inflation, the expected one-period
ahead inflation (Et (πt+1)), the current output gap (xt), the lagged output gap, the expected
one-period ahead output gap, and a cost-push shock (µt).
A fraction of firms given by the parameter 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 are assumed to be unable to
adjust their prices every period, while the remaining fraction (1 − θ) of firms can. The
non-reoptimizing firms index their prices to past inflation with the degree of indexation
determined by the parameter 0 ≤ ιp ≤ 1. Furthermore, the parameter ω > 0 is the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, while the composite coeffi cient ξp is defined as
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ
with β being the household’s intertemporal discount factor and θ the constant fraction of
non-reoptimizing firms per period.
We use (5) to re-express the system of equations given by (1) − (2) to describe the
dynamics of the economy in terms of actual and potential output as follows:
ỹt = Et (ỹt+1)− (1− βη) (1− η) (it − Etπt+1 − rnt )− Et
(
∆ỹnt+1
)
, (7)
π̃t = ξp
(
ωyt + ((1− βη) (1− η))−1 ỹt
)
+ βEtπ̃t+1 + µt
− ξp
(
ωynt + ((1− βη) (1− η))
−1 ỹnt
)
.
(8)
Based on the output potential transformation in (4), we can further re-write the system of
equations in (1)− (2) to obtain that:
ỹt = Et (ỹt+1)− (1− βη) (1− η) (it − Etπt+1 − rnt )
−
(
ηynt−1 − (1 + η + βη2) ynt + (1 + βη + βη2)Et
(
ynt+1
)
− βηEt
(
ynt+2
))
,
(9)
π̃t = ξp (ωyt + ((1− βη) (1− η))−1ỹt) + βEtπ̃t+1 + µt
− ξp
(
− ((1− βη) (1− η))−1 ηynt−1 +
(
ω + ((1− βη) (1− η))−1 (1 + βη2)
)
ynt
− ((1− βη) (1− η))−1 βηEt
(
ynt+1
) ) ,
(10)
with the same structural relationships as the system of equations given by (7) − (8). This
showcases that the dynamic IS and NKPC equations can be expressed in terms of three
observable macro variables: output (yt), inflation (πt), and the policy rate (it), i.e., in terms
of the three-variable vector Yt = [yt, πt, it]
′
. Moreover, these equations also show that cost-
push shocks (µt) as well as exogenously-driven shifts in the output potential (y
n
t ) and the
8
natural rate of interest (rnt ) affect the dynamics of output (yt) and inflation (πt).
Frictionless Allocation. The potential output allocation (ynt ) and the natural real rate
(rnt ) are important constructs in our analysis and represent the levels of output and of the
real interest rate that would prevail absent all nominal rigidities. In that counterfactual
scenario, output potential (ynt ) evolves according to the following equation:
ωynt +
1
(1−βη)(1−η)
(
ynt − ηynt−1
)
− βη
(1−βη)(1−η)
(
Et
(
ynt+1
)
− ηynt
)
= η
(1−βη)(1−η)
(
βEt
(
γt+1
)
− γt
)
.
(11)
The previous equation follows from Cúrdia et al. (2015). Equation (11) implies that output
potential is a linear combination of current, lagged, and future expected values of output
potential as well as current and future expected values of exogenous productivity growth,
γt ≡ ∆ ln (At) where At denotes total factor productivity (TFP). Given the effi cient allo-
cation of the output potential (ynt ) in (11), the household’s intertemporal Euler equation
implies that the natural rate of interest (rnt ) can be expressed as:
rnt = Et
(
γt+1
)
− ωEt
(
∆ynt+1
)
. (12)
Equations (11) and (12) highlight the close connection between output potential and the
natural rate of interest both of which respond to a common shock– the exogenous shock to
productivity growth (γt).
Here, we observe that the natural rate of interest depends: (a) positively on the fore-
castable components of next period’s exogenous productivity growth (γt), and (b) negatively
on the forecastable component of next period’s growth rate of output potential (∆ynt+1) which
itself depends on the exogenous productivity growth (γt) through equation (11). Intuitively,
point (b) captures the negative effect on the real interest rate of a higher expected growth
rate of marginal utility which, under standard market clearing conditions, directly influences
potential hours worked and in turn potential output.
Exogenous (Non-Monetary) Shock Processes. The exogenous shock to productivity
growth (γt) and the cost-push shock (µt) are assumed to follow standard AR(1) processes:
γt = ργγt−1 + ε
γ
t , (13)
µt = ρµµt−1 + ε
µ
t , (14)
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where εγt
iid∼ N
(
0, σ2γ
)
and εµt
iid∼ N
(
0, σ2µ
)
.8 The persistence of the productivity growth
and cost-push shocks is given by the parameters 0 < ργ < 1 and 0 < ρµ < 1, respectively.
Similarly, the volatility of the productivity growth and cost-push shocks is given by σ2γ > 0
and σ2µ > 0, respectively. We do not consider spillovers between productivity growth and
cost-push shocks and assume that their respective innovations are uncorrelated at all leads
and lags.
2.2 Monetary Policy
The monetary policy framework relies on the short-term nominal interest rate (it) as its policy
instrument. A Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy rule is generally viewed as a simple and
practical guide for the conduct of monetary policy in the U.S.9 Henceforth, we assume that
the central bank follows a variant of the Taylor (1993) rule whereby the nominal interest
rate responds to inflation deviations from its zero-inflation target (πt) and possibly also to
fluctuations in the output gap (xt ≡ (yt − ynt )), i.e.,
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (χππt + χx (yt − ynt )) + εMPt . (15)
This policy rule ensures the determinacy of the equilibrium whenever the policy parameters
satisfy the Taylor principle, that is, whenever χπ > 1 and χx ≥ 0. The rule also includes
lagged interest rates with a smoothing parameter given by 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and a monetary policy
shock term (εMPt ).
We introduce time-contingent forward guidance in the Taylor (1993) rule in the form of
anticipated monetary policy shocks (news) following the approach of Del Negro et al. (2012),
Cole (2020a), and Cole (2020b). Specifically, the monetary policy rule in (15) is augmented
as follows:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [χππt + χx (yt − ynt )] + εMPt +
∑L
l=1
εFGl,t−l, (16)
where the unanticipated (surprise) monetary policy shocks (εMPt ) are combined with forward
guidance (news) shocks (εFGl,t−l for all l = 1, ..., L).
10 The length of the forward guidance
horizon provided by the news shocks is defined by the horizon 1 ≤ L < +∞ implying that
8In regards to equation (13), we have also considered a specification with a constant term. The results
were largely robust and did not qualitatively change the main conclusions of this paper.
9A Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy rule tends to result in little loss of performance relative to an
optimal discretionary rule as noted, e.g., by Dennis (2004).
10Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) utilize anticipated shocks and describe them as “news”. However, they
do not explicitly study forward guidance via monetary policy news shocks and its economic effects.
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there is a finite number of L forward guidance shocks in the summation term in equation
(16).
Monetary policy surprises and forward guidance shocks are assumed to be purely transi-
tory or i.i.d., i.e.,
εMPt
iid∼ N
(
0, σ2MP
)
, (17)
εFGl,t−l
iid∼ N
(
0, σ2,FGl
)
, ∀l = 1, ..., L, and 1 ≤ L < +∞. (18)
Each εFGl,t−l in equation (16) represents anticipated or news shocks that private agents know
about in period t − l but do not affect the interest rate until l periods later, that is, until
period t. The volatility of the unanticipated and anticipated monetary policy shocks is given
by σ2MP > 0 and σ
2,FG
l > 0 for all l = 1, ..., L, respectively. The innovations of anticipated
and unanticipated monetary policy shocks are uncorrelated with each other and with the
cost-push shock and productivity growth shock innovations at all leads and lags.
Following Laséen and Svensson (2011) and Del Negro et al. (2012), the following recursive
representation is added to the model’s system of equations to describe the news shocks:11
v1,t = v2,t−1 + ε
FG
1,t , (19)
v2,t = v3,t−1 + ε
FG
2,t , (20)
...
vL,t = ε
FG
L,t . (21)
Each component of the vector vt = [v1,t, v2,t, . . . , vL,t]
′ represents all past and present central
bank announcements to change the interest rate 1, 2, . . . , L periods later that private agents
know in period t. In addition, we define ψt =
[
εFG1,t , ε
FG
2,t , . . . , ε
FG
L,t
]′
as the vector containing
all current-period forward guidance shocks known today that affect the monetary policy
rule 1, 2, . . . , L periods later. Equations (19) − (21) can be simplified to show that v1,t−1
corresponds to the last term in equation (16), i.e., the summation of all anticipated monetary
policy shocks realized at time t, v1,t−1 =
∑L
l=1 ε
FG
l,t−l.
11Laséen and Svensson (2011) argue that standard solution techniques apply when forward guidance is
modeled as described here rather than as a peg on the future path of the policy rate. Moreover, this
implementation also helps us avoid the indeterminacy issues which can arise when modeling central bank
forward guidance as pegging the future path of interest rates to a certain value (see, e.g., Honkapohja and
Mitra (2005) and Woodford (2005)). Indeed, the method used here based on anticipated monetary policy
shocks (news) alleviates this concern.
11
Accordingly, the policy rule in (16) can be re-expressed more compactly as:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [χππt + χx (yt − ynt )] + εMPt + v1,t−1. (22)
The method of using equations (22) together with (17) − (21) provides a tractable way to
incorporate anticipated monetary policy (forward guidance) shocks as well as conventional
unanticipated monetary policy shocks into the policy framework. This monetary policy
regime, therefore, involves forward guidance shocks which can be interpreted as the means
by which the central bank communicates (announces) the time-contingent path of future
policy rates.
Expectations Augmented Vector of Observable Variables. The state equations that
describe the dynamics of the economy in (9)−(10), together with (3)−(4) and (6), pin down
the solution to the vector of three observable macro variables given by Yt = [yt, πt, it]
′
which
includes actual output (yt), inflation (πt), and the policy rate (it). However, with monetary
policy shocks split into unanticipated (surprise) and anticipated (news) shocks, the vector
of observable variables Yt lacks fundamentalness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (1980)
and Martínez-García (2018). In other words, these three observable macro variables do
not contain enough information to pin down the vector of unobserved structural shocks
εt =
(
γt, µt, ε
MP
t ,
{
εFGl,t−l
}L
l=1
)′
. Without additional observable variables, we can only recover
residuals that are linear combinations of the underlying structural shocks.
Given the monetary policy rule in equation (16), we can show that the expected future
path of the policy rate at time t can be written as follows:12
Et (it+s) =

ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [χππt + χx (yt − ynt )] + εMPt + v1,t−1, for s = 0,
ρit−1+s + (1− ρ)
[
χπEt (πt+s) + χxEt
(
yt+s − ynt+s
)]
+ vs+1,t−1 + ε
FG
s,t , ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., L− 1} ,
ρit−1+s + (1− ρ)
[
χπEt (πt+s) + χxEt
(
yt+s − ynt+s
)]
+ εFGs,t , for s = L,
ρit−1+s + (1− ρ)
[
χπEt (πt+s) + χxEt
(
yt+s − ynt+s
)]
, ∀s > L.
(23)
Hence, the expression in (23) shows that– consistent with expectations about inflation and
economic activity– expectations on the future path of the interest rate should shift in re-
sponse to announcements of anticipated (forward guidance) monetary policy shocks helping
us tease them apart from unanticipated (surprise) monetary policy shocks. Given this, we
adopt the identification strategy explored by Doehr and Martínez-García (2015) in a VAR
12In Subsection 2.3, we show how to model aggregate expectations that mixes FIRE and VAR-based
expectations.
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setting and employed by Cole and Milani (2017) within a DSGE model which consists in aug-
menting the vector of observables Yt = [yt, πt, it]
′ with expectations with which to disentangle
anticipated from unanticipated monetary policy shocks.13
We expand the vector of observables Yt with expectations as follows:
Y t = [yt, πt, it,Et (∆yt+1) ,Et (∆yt+2) ,Et (πt+1) ,Et (it+1) , ...,Et (it+L)]
′
, (24)
where ∆yt+j = ∆xt+j + ∆ynt+j denotes the growth rate of actual output in time period t+ j
(for j = 1, 2) and, by analogy, we define ∆ynt+j =
(
ynt+j − ynt+j−1
)
to be the corresponding
growth rate of output potential in time period t + j.14 Given the structure of the economy
described by equations (9)−(10), the non-monetary shock processes in (11)−(14), the Taylor
(1993) rule in (22), and the unanticipated and anticipated monetary policy shocks given by
(17) − (21), the vector of observables augmented with expectations Y t in (24) suffi ces to
ensure that we can identify all structural shocks εt =
(
γt, µt, ε
MP
t ,
{
εFGl,t−l
}L
l=1
)′
.
2.3 Central Bank Credibility
Forward guidance opens up the possibility for central banks to manage expectations but
is inherently time-inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott (1977)), that is, forward guidance
are promises about future monetary policy that the central bank may find beneficial to
renege from unless future policymakers could be bound somehow to credibly honor those
commitments when the time comes.
This is partly because, while the vector of observables Yt = [yt, πt, it]
′
can be monitored
with observable data, neither announcements about the expected future path of the policy
rate (news shocks) nor the central bank’s own public forecasts– if used to communicate the
forward guidance policy– can be confirmed and validated with the observed current data Yt
13Alternatively, we could also use the yield curve to help us identify the news shocks. Assuming the
expectations hypothesis of the terms structure of interest rates holds, it follows from equations (16) and (23)
that the long-term nominal interest at any given maturity n ≥ L+ 1 (int ) can be expressed as:
int = ρ
(
1
n
∑n−1
z=0 Etit−1+z
)
+ (1− ρ)
[
χπ
(
1
n
∑n−1
z=0 Etπt+z
)
+χx
(
1
n
∑n−1
z=0 Etxt+z
)]
+ 1n
(
εMPt + v1,t−1 +
∑L
l=1 v
FG
l,t
)
.
Working directly with the expected path of the policy rate, as we do in this paper, lessens the concern that
using longer maturity rates along the yield curve means that we are jointly testing the validity of our model
and that of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates too.
14In estimations, we use up to five periods ahead of the interest rate forecasts as part of our observables
(i.e., up to Et (it+5)) given the data available in the SPF dataset. The corresponding observation equations
will be described in more detail in Subsection 3.2.1.
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or its lags at the time the announcement is made. It is also partly because central banks
have incentives to deviate from those commitments.
Simply put, private agents realize that there is neither a full-proof verification mechanism
nor a way to enforce those promises to ensure that the central bank delivers on the future
policy path that has been announced and must form expectations accordingly. This implies
that private agents have to factor the credibility of the central bank’s forward guidance
commitment in forming their own expectations about the future.
We assume that private agents that believe the central bank’s commitments not to be
credible form their expectations about the observables using a standard VAR model and
committing themselves to forecast the future path of the economy in that way (ignoring all
announcements until they materialize– if at all– at a later time). That is, private agents
forecast the observable vector Yt = [yt, πt, it]
′ with the following parsimonious structural
VAR(1) process in mind:
Yt = A+BYt−1 + ut, (25)
which captures well the historical dynamics of Yt in our sample. Here, A and B are reduced-
form matrices of conforming dimensions, and ut is a vector of (non-structural) residuals.15
Following on the footsteps of the axiomatic approach for heterogenous beliefs of Branch
and McGough (2009), aggregate expectations (Et (Yt+1)) are a weighted sum of expectations
from private agents who believe the central bank to be credible and those who do not.16
Specifically, we define aggregate expectations as follows:
Et (Yt+1) = τECt (Yt+1) + (1− τ)EDt (Yt+1) , (26)
where ECt (Yt+1) represents the fully rational forecasts of private agents when the central
bank’s commitments are viewed as fully credible and EDt (Yt+1) denotes the expectations
of private agents who believe the monetary authority’s commitment to be not credible. As
stated above, the latter form expectations based on equation (25). Equation (26) also follows
Haberis et al. (2019) who model aggregate expectations as a weighted average of FIRE and
VARs.
15In our estimation, the parameters of A and B in (25) would be recovered jointly as part of the full
structural model. Therefore, the resulting estimates reflect the information available for the full sample. We
leave the issue of learning about A and B, and its stability properties, for future research.
16We assume households own the firms and we often refer to the firm-owning households as private agents.
This implies that, in our benchmark economy, the expectations of households will not differ from those of
firms that enter into the aggregate demand and price-setting behavior equations in equilibrium. We leave
for future research the exploration of richer environments where firms’expectations may differ from those
of households.
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The parameter 0 < τ < 1 determines the odds placed on ECt (Yt+1) or, alternatively,
the share of private agents that forms FIRE expectations. We refer to τ as the credibility
parameter of the model.17 In the limiting case where τ → 1, all private agents in the economy
believe the central bank to be perfectly credible, expectations are homogenous across agents,
and EtYt+1 = Et
(
Y Ct+1
)
. In the opposite polar case where τ → 0, the monetary authority is
considered not to be credible and homogenous beliefs imply that Et (Yt+1) = EDt (Yt+1).
In general, aggregate expectations of private agents would be a convex combination
weighed by a parameter τ that lies within the unit interval. This is the benchmark model
we estimate in this paper and inevitably leads to an economy where forward guidance loses
some of its power if τ is strictly less than one.
3 Bayesian Estimation Methods
The workhorse New Keynesian model with forward guidance and central bank credibility
that we have laid out here includes equations for aggregate demand (the dynamic IS curve),
the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), potential output, the effi cient real interest rate
(or natural rate), and the AR(1) processes for the productivity growth shock and for the
cost-push shock. Moreover, the model is completed with a Taylor (1993) monetary policy
rule with inertia and surprise monetary policy shocks, forward guidance (news shocks),
and a recursive representation of the central bank’s promises regarding changes to future
interest rates (announcements). The private agents’ expectations are based on a VAR if
the central bank is not viewed as credible and based on FIRE expectations if credible,
while heterogenous-beliefs aggregate expectations are weighted by a central bank’s credibility
parameter. In other words, the benchmark model that estimate includes equations (9), (10),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (16), (19)−(21), (25), and (26). We implement our estimation strategy
and approach using Dynare codes (Adjemian et al. (2011)).
17There could be alternative ways to motivate the credibility parameter 0 < τ < 1. In this paper,
we suggest an interpretation based on the equilibrium of a game-theoretic framework between rational-
expectations private agents and the central bank through the lens of an evolutionary-type “game of chicken”
(Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). This credibility game is presented in the Appendix which provides all
the necessary details on its structure and solution. However, for our analysis what is most crucial is that
there is at least a fraction of agents in the economy making forecasts that abstract from monetary policy
announcements as would be the case for those using VAR-based forecasts. Credibility in this more broad
sense is something to be earned– if forward guidance commitments would be believed or thought to be
effective, then private agents would be making systematic errors with VAR-based forecast that puts them
at a disadvantage and more of them would recognize that like fully rational agents do.
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3.1 Data Sources
We utilize Bayesian estimation techniques with U.S. macroeconomic time series variables
at a quarterly frequency. Data for output, inflation, and interest rates correspond to U.S.
real GDP growth, the growth rate in the GDP deflator, and the Federal Funds rate. The
relevant acronyms are GDPC1, GDPDEF, and FEDFUNDS with the data retrieved from
the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We also employ observations
for expectations of future macroeconomic variables. Specifically, we utilize expectations
regarding one-quarter and two-quarters ahead output growth, one-quarter ahead inflation,
and one-quarter to five-quarters ahead interest rates. These forecast series are retrieved
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia (FRB of Philadelphia (2019)).18 The relevant acronyms are RGDP, PGDP,
and TBILL. In addition, our dataset spans 1981 : Q3 through 2017 : Q3.19
18We use the mean value across respondents.
19Forward guidance outside the explicit forward guidance statements that emanated in the aftermath
of the 2007 − 2009 financial recession can still be found in our dataset. Campbell et al. (2012) explain
that the FOMC has issued implicit and explicit forward guidance long before the 2007 − 2009 financial
recession. Lindsey (2003) also discusses types of central bank communication in the 1980s in the U.S.
Wynne (2013) explains how FOMC statements to the public have evolved from vague text in the early 1990s
to more specific and clarifying statements post-2009. Contessi and Li (2013) also discuss FOMC statements
containing elements of forward guidance in the early 2000s. BIS (2019) provides a detailed description an
assessment of forward guidance and other monetary policy tools since the 2007− 2009 financial recession for
the U.S. and across other countries with related experiences.
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3.2 Estimation Strategy
3.2.1 Observation Equations
The observation equations mapping the model variables into the data are given by the
following system of equations:
gobst
πobst
iobst
Eobst (gt+1)
Eobst (gt+2)
Eobst (πt+1)
Eobst (it+1)
Eobst (it+2)
Eobst (it+3)
Eobst (it+4)
Eobst (it+5)

=

∆yt
πt
it
Et (∆yt+1)
Et (∆yt+2)
Et (πt+1)
Et (it+1)
Et (it+2)
Et (it+3)
Et (it+4)
Et (it+5)

+

γ̄g + γt
γ̄π
γ̄r
γ̄g
1
+ Et
(
γt+1
)
γ̄g
2
+ Et
(
γt+2
)
γ̄π
γ̄r
1
γ̄r
2
γ̄r
3
γ̄r
4
γ̄r
5

+
[
03×8
I8×8
]

o
gt+1
t
o
gt+2
t
o
πt+1
t
o
it+1
t
o
it+2
t
o
it+3
t
o
it+4
t
o
it+5
t

, (27)
where gt ≡ ∆yt represents the growth rate of output in time period t. Observations for
expectations include an i.i.d. measurement error term, i.e., ogt+1t , o
gt+2
t , o
πt+1
t , o
it+1
t , o
it+2
t , o
it+3
t ,
o
it+4
t , and o
it+5
t . This mapping is similar to that of Cole and Milani (2017) and consistent
with the expectations-augmented approach to disentangle between news and surprises about
monetary policy proposed by Doehr and Martínez-García (2015).
It is important to clarify how the SPF expectations align with model implied expectations.
From the SPF documentation (FRB of Philadelphia (2019)), the respondents of the SPF
usually have to report their forecasts before the middle of the current quarter. For instance,
in regards to forecasts for Q1, the deadline submission date is the second to third week of
February. The nowcast is approximately a 2−month ahead forecast while the one-quarter
ahead is a 5−month ahead forecast and so on. For that reason, a number of papers in the
literature most closely connected to ours map the nowcast of the forecasted variables of the
SPF as the one-quarter ahead forecast in the model (e.g., that of Cole and Milani (2017)).
In our baseline analysis, we also treat the SPF nowcast as corresponding to the one-quarter
ahead forecasts in our benchmark model to ensure comparability.20 However, in Subsection
20As we utilize the nowcast for t + 1 expectations, we have SPF data for the nowcast and up to four-
quarters ahead for the estimation (which we exploit to its fullest). Hence, in the benchmark model, equation
((27)) includes up to five periods ahead interest rate expectations (i.e., Eobst (it+1), Eobst (it+2), Eobst (it+3),
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5.4, we also analyze the baseline results under a different (and plausible) timing convention
using instead one-quarter ahead SPF forecasts as the one-quarter expectations in the model.
3.2.2 Choice of Priors
The choice of prior distributions on the structural parameters largely follows Cole and Milani
(2017) and Smets and Wouters (2007).21 The price indexation parameter ιp is assumed to
have a prior distribution of Beta. We select a Normal distribution centered over 1 for the
prior distribution of ω. We also assume persistence in the productivity growth and cost-push
shocks as these both have Beta prior distributions with mean of 0.50. To ensure positive
values, the prior distributions on the standard deviations of the shocks are chosen to be
Inverse Gamma.
The prior distribution of the policy parameters are also standard from prior studies. The
priors on the χπ and χx are both Normal centered over 1.5 and 0.125, respectively. We
assume there exists a high degree of persistence a priori when the central bank adjusts the
interest rate as ρ follows a Beta with mean 0.75. The prior assumptions on the previous three
parameters follow from Smets and Wouters (2007). In addition, the value of the forward
guidance horizon is chosen to be twelve periods, that is, L = 12. This assumption is based on
the FOMC statement utilizing time-contingent forward guidance. Specifically, in September
2012, the FOMC stated “the Committee also . . . anticipates that exceptionally low levels
for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.”Thus, there
are twelve quarters from September 2012 and “mid-2015”if the latter date is taken to be
the end of quarter three of 2015.
The central parameter in our model is τ , which measures the degree of central bank
credibility in the economy. As described above, all agents in the economy believe central
bank statements to be perfectly credible whenever τ → 1. If τ → 0, the central bank is
not perceived to be credible and agents do not factor forward guidance statements into their
forecasts. In our benchmark estimation, we choose an informative prior distribution, a beta
with mean 0.8. However, as this parameter τ is central to our analysis, we will conduct some
robustness checks in Subsection 5.3. Specifically, we compare the baseline results to the case
if one is more agnostic about the true value of τ and adopts a uniform distribution.
Eobst (it+4), and Eobst (it+5)).
21The following parameters are fixed: the household’s intertemporal discount factor β is set to 0.99,
habit persistence η is fixed at 0.50, and the composite coeffi cient ξp is set to 0.0015. The latter two values
roughly follow Cúrdia et al. (2015) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004), respectively. The constants in the
observation equations in (27) are fixed to the historical mean of their respective series.
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3.2.3 Reduced-Form Forecasting Model
The current paper assumes that expectations for the entire economy are composed of a
weighted sum of FIRE expectations under perfect credibility and VAR-based expectations
that simply ignore the forward guidance statements. As stated in equation (25), the latter
type of agents form expectations via a VAR(1) process. However, it is important to justify
the lag length of this forecasting model. To accomplish this task, we calculate the Bayes
Information Criterion (BIC) for a VAR(1), a VAR(2), and a VAR(3) model on the vector
of observables Y obst =
[
gobst , π
obs
t , i
obs
t
]
.22 The BIC values for the three models are −31.16,
−20.05, and 4.56, respectively. Thus, we utilize the VAR(1) as it has the lowest BIC.
4 Main Results
4.1 Estimates of Central Bank Credibility
We now proceed with our main empirical exercise to investigate the effects that central bank
credibility has on the effi cacy of forward guidance. When we estimate τ , we refer to this case
as the not perfectly credible central bank scenario, denoted τ̂ . When we do not estimate
τ and assume private agents perceive the monetary authority to be perfectly credible, we
define this case setting τ = 1 in the estimation. The results are shown via three channels:
posterior point estimates, variance decomposition, and impulse response functions under
both perfectly credible and imperfectly credible central banks. Table 1 and Table 2 display
the posterior mean and 90% highest posterior density interval estimates. Table 3 shows
the conditional variance decomposition upon impact of the structural and forward guidance
shocks with parameter values at their posterior mean. The last line calculates the sum of all
the variation in the macroeconomic variable due to the forward guidance shocks. Figure 1
and Figure 2 display the impulse response functions to forward guidance shocks at different
horizons while Figure 3 displays the impulse response functions for the productivity growth,
cost-push, and unanticipated monetary policy shocks. Each panel shows the mean response
of the model-implied output and the other macro observables (inflation and interest rate).
The solid line represents τ = 1, while the dashed line denotes τ̂ .
We first examine the case in which the monetary authority is perceived to be perfectly
credible. In Table 1 and Table 2 the first three columns under “Posterior Distribution”show
that the estimates of the main structural parameters largely align with prior literature. The
22For this, we use data spanning 1985 : Q1 through 2007 : Q3. This period corresponds to the Great
Moderation era in the U.S.
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estimated value of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ω = 0.9709 follows
closely that of Cúrdia et al. (2015). The interest rate smoothing parameter is estimated to
be high at 0.8817 which closely aligns the value found in Milani (2007) using a model with
FIRE expectations. The estimates for the degree of productivity growth inertia (ργ) and
inflation indexation (ιp) roughly follow the results found in Cúrdia et al. (2015) under their
“W”rule.23
The solid lines in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the mean impulse response under τ = 1
to a one standard deviation increase in a shock. Specifically, given that agents are forward
looking, news that the interest rate will increase 1, 4, 8, or 12 periods ahead affects agents’
intertemporal decisions by (noticeably) lowering output and inflation on impact. When
the shock is realized on the economy, output (roughly) reaches its trough. Since those who
perceive the monetary authority to be perfectly credible form their expectations under FIRE,
these agents completely understand the shock has already materialized, and thus, output,
inflation, and interest rates proceed to return back to steady state.24
What are the predicted effects if the central bank is not assumed to be perfectly credible?
To answer this question, we first analyze the posterior estimates in the last three columns in
Table 1 and Table 2. Overall, the values of the main structural parameters do not drastically
differ from the perfectly credible case, but do display a few slight differences. For instance,
in the last three columns under “Not Perfectly Credible C.B.,” the estimated value of the
autoregressive parameter on the cost-push shock is relatively lower than in the τ = 1 scenario.
However, this lower persistence could instead be picked up by the higher estimates for the
inflation indexation parameter relative to the perfectly credible central bank case.25
More importantly, when allowing private agents the option of not fully believing forward
guidance statements about the path of interest rates, the estimate of the credibility parameter
τ is 0.7696. This value indicates a certain level of trust in the U.S. central bank (i.e., the
Federal Reserve) implying effectiveness of forward guidance on the economy.26 However, the
fact that this estimated value is not close to τ = 1 suggests that private agents do not believe
23The posterior mean estimate for σγ is relatively lower than in Cúrdia et al. (2015). However, this low
value could be due to the inclusion of forward guidance shocks and heterogenous expectations in the present
paper that do not feature in their model.
24The relative smoothness of the output impulse responses could be due to a mixture of habits in con-
sumption and the fact that when private agents believe the forward guidance statements to be fully credible
before it materializes l periods later anticipate their decisions accordingly.
25The parameter ργ is also estimated to be lower than under the τ = 1 scenario. This result comes in
hand with the fact tht the standard error of the productivity shock has a higher value under τ̂ than under
τ = 1.
26This result does agree with Swanson (2018) who finds that forward guidance has a degree of effectiveness
when the economy is constrained by ZLB.
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the monetary authority to be perfectly credible (or at least act in forming their expectations
as if monetary policy announcements were not credible).
The ramifications of this result are a dampening of the power of forward guidance on
the economy. Figure 1 and Figure 2 display this outcome. The impulse responses under τ̂
(dashed line) follow similar paths as under τ = 1 (solid line). However, the dashed line is not
as reactive to central bank forward guidance as the solid line. Specifically, the initial impact
of output and inflation to forward guidance news is larger under the perfectly credible case
than under the imperfectly credible scenario. When the shock is realized on the economy l
periods later, the responses of output and inflation are also overall larger under τ = 1 than τ̂ .
The reason for the discrepancies is that private agents believe central bank statements about
future interest rates under the τ = 1 scenario, and thus, fully internalize the effects of forward
guidance. In contrast, agents who do not fully believe forward guidance commitments do
not incorporate the full effects of forward guidance, and thus, macroeconomic variables are
not as responsive.
Variance decomposition results also display the reduced effects of forward guidance on
the economy under an imperfectly credible monetary authority. In Table 3 we compute
the conditional variance decomposition upon impact of the shocks with parameter values
at their posterior mean. The combined contribution of the forward guidance shocks to
output and inflation is less under τ̂ than τ = 1. Under a central bank that is perceived
as imperfectly credible, the total contribution of εFG1,t , ε
FG
2,t ,..., ε
FG
12,t to output and inflation
is 7.5346% and 0.0004%, respectively.27 Under a monetary authority perceived as perfectly
credible, the combined contribution is 23.1357% and 1.3579%. Thus, if a central bank is
perceived as more credible, there exist greater immediate effects on the real economy from
forward guidance but with little effect on prices. To put it another way, if a central bank
is less credible, the immediate effects on output are not as great relative to the perfectly
credible scenario.
The results show that modeling forward guidance credibility contributes to address the
“forward guidance puzzle”of Del Negro et al. (2012). In the previously mentioned paper,
the authors explain that a standard New Keynesian models similar to the one presented
in Section 2 produces unusually large responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward
guidance shocks. Those sizeable responses do not seem to reconcile well with the data.
In contrast, our paper allows for private agents to not perceive the monetary authority as
27Without rounding the numbers, it should be noted that the contribution of each of the forward guidance
shocks to inflation is a small, positive number. This low value agrees well with the response of inflation upon
impact to forward guidance shocks found in the impulse response graphs (i.e., Figure 1 and Figure 2).
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perfectly credible. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the results show that the reaction
of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance shocks is dampened and not as large under
τ̂ relative to τ = 1.
Overall, the results of our main exercise suggest a number of takeaways. Our estimate
of Federal Reserve credibility is high at τ̂ = 0.7696. However, this estimated value is below
the fully credible case which leads to an attenuation of the power of forward guidance. If
the central bank is perceived as less credible, there exist less immediate and overall effects
on the economy from forward guidance. Hence, the integration of imperfect central bank
credibility into a standard macroeconomic model can be another approach to resolve the
forward guidance puzzle. Thus, accounting for imperfect credibility is important to model
the formation of expectations in the economy and the transmission mechanism of forward
guidance announcements.
4.2 Predictability of Forecasting Errors
Our benchmark model assumed that expectations in the economy are a weighted sum of pri-
vate agents who believe the central bank to be perfectly credible and private agents who be-
lieve the monetary authority not to be credible. The former group forecasts macroeconomic
variables under the assumption of FIRE expectations, while the latter uses a data-driven
VAR(1) model. However, a natural question is whether aggregate expectations weighted by
τ or the perfectly credible case is the more plausible method to model expectations?
Standard macroeconomic models often consider only the τ = 1 case, that is, FIRE
expectations. In this scenario, forecast errors will be random and on average be equal to zero,
and thus, not dependent or correlated with forecasting disagreements among private agents
(see, e.g., Sims (2002) and Cole and Milani (2017)). However, do the forecast errors from the
data agree with those implications of the τ = 1 scenario? Or does the imperfect credibility
scenario with τ̂ capturing the estimated central bank credibility fit the data better? To
answer this, a further corroborating exercise involves comparing the forecast errors from our
model with imperfect central bank credibility to what is found in the observed forecasting
data.28
We proceed in the following manner. We define forecasting errors of the interest rate
at the one-quarter ahead horizon as FE1t = Et−1 (it) − it. The remaining forecast er-
28Indeed, non-random forecast errors have been found in other settings. Andrade and Le Bihan (2013)
examine the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters and Czudaj and Beckmann (2018) study expectations
for the G7 countries. Both papers find nonrandom forecasts errors in the data. Coibion et al. (2012) and
Coibion et al. (2015) also test FIRE and show that information rigidities exist in the forecasts of agents.
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rors are defined as FE2t = Et−2 (it) − it, FE3t = Et−3 (it) − it, FE4t = Et−4 (it) − it, and
FE5t = Et−5 (it) − it at the two, three, four, and five-quarters ahead horizons, respectively.
Forecasting disagreement (DEV 1t ) at the one-quarter ahead horizon is specified as the dif-
ference between the 75th and 25th percentile (i.e., the interquartile range of the SPF data).
The remaining forecasting disagreements are given by DEV 2t , DEV
3
t , DEV
4
t , and DEV
5
t at
the two, three, four, and five-quarters ahead horizons, respectively.
We collect data from the U.S. economy. Forecasting errors are computed with respect to
the mean forecast with SPF data. The relevant acronym is TBILL. Forecasting disagreements
are measured with the interquartile range of the cross-sectional distribution of individual
forecasts in order to make the empirical results less sensitive to outliers.29 The data span
1981 : Q3 − 2018 : Q4 for the baseline case implying 150 observations. We run separate
regressions of FEht on DEV
h
t at the one, two, three, four, and five-quarters ahead horizons
(h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5):
FE1t = δ
1
0 + δ
1
1DEV
1
t + e
1
t , (28)
FE2t = δ
2
0 + δ
2
1DEV
2
t + e
2
t , (29)
FE3t = δ
3
0 + δ
3
1DEV
3
t + e
3
t , (30)
FE4t = δ
4
0 + δ
4
1DEV
4
t + e
4
t , (31)
FE5t = δ
5
0 + δ
5
1DEV
5
t + e
5
t . (32)
The usual regression error terms are described by e1t , e
2
t , e
3
t , e
4
t , and e
5
t at the one, two, three,
four, and five-quarters ahead horizons, respectively.
Furthermore, we perform the same exercise using the simulated counterparts from our
model. Specifically, we simulate the model at the posterior mean for a time period of 2, 000
observations discarding the first 100 simulated observations. We then perform the same
regressions given by equations (28) − (32) on a rolling window of 150 observations.30 We
compute our results on 10, 000 different draws of the simulated data.
The full range of rolling window estimates are represented in Figure 4, which shows a box-
and-whisker plot that displays their min, max, median, and interquartile range. The point
estimates obtained from the SPF data are also shown in Figure 4. The orange circles denote
estimates of δ11, δ
2
1, δ
3
1, δ
4
1, and δ
5
1 from the benchmark dataset (i.e., 1981 : Q3− 2018 : Q4).
29We have considered the same exercise where DEV is specified as the difference between the 90th and
10th percentile and similar results occurred.
30The forecasting disagreements like DEV 1t are computed the difference between the highest and lowest
forecasts implied by ECt−1 (it) and EDt−1 (it).
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The red diamonds represent estimates from the non-ZLB period of our dataset, that is, from
the 1981 : Q3− 2008 : Q4 subsample.
We first examine what the data would postulate regarding the relationship between fore-
casting errors and forecasting disagreements. By using SPF data, estimates of δ11, δ
2
1, δ
3
1, δ
4
1,
and δ51 show that forecasting errors are positively correlated with forecasting disagreement.
The orange circles and red diamonds in Figure 4 are positive and notably display an upward
trajectory as the forecast horizon increases. This challenges the assumption that forecasting
errors ought to be unpredictable under the perfect credibility case with FIRE expectations
of τ = 1.
What occurs when private agents perceive the central bank as not perfectly credible?
The simple answer is that the model under τ̂ seems to match the data better than the τ = 1
case. In Figure 4, the estimates δ11, δ
2
1, δ
3
1, δ
4
1, and δ
5
1 using SPF data lie towards the median
of their respective box-and-whisker plots under τ̂ . The median of the box-and-whisker plots
are also in positive territory, which matches their counterparts in the data. In addition,
under both SPF and simulated data, estimates of δ11, δ
2
1, δ
3
1, δ
4
1, and δ
5
1 display an upward
trend the longer the forecasting horizon. This result provides further external validation for
our approach of modeling aggregate expectations with τ capturing central bank credibility.
In short, our model of central bank credibility matches the data well when utilizing SPF
data to seek external cross-validation for our model’s expectations framework. In the data,
there exists notable disagreements among forecasters. The fully credible central bank model
(i.e., the τ = 1 scenario) cannot capture this feature of the SPF data. However, when we relax
this assumption, and allow agents to perceive the central bank as not fully credible, the fit to
the data substantially improves. This is not to say that monetary policy credibility explains
all forecasting disagreements, but that it is a plausible reason for forecasting heterogeneity
that can reconcile the model with the forecasting predictability that we find in the SPF data.
5 Robustness
A main result of our paper is that the higher the value of the central bank credibility
parameter, τ , the greater the effects of forward guidance on the economy. In particular, τ
is estimated to be 0.7696 for the U.S. economy. This high value implies a higher degree of
Federal Reserve credibility as perceived by private agents in the economy, and thus, a robust
level of effectiveness from forward guidance. However, the estimated value of τ is below the
fully credible case (i.e., below τ = 1). In the following subsections, we analyze the robustness
24
of this result. Specifically, we examine the sensitivity of the benchmark outcomes to the
time period used in the estimation, the presence of macroeconomic persistence features, the
forecasting model used by private sector agents, the prior beliefs about τ , and the timing
assumption matching SPF forecasts to our model’s expectations.
5.1 Subsamples
5.1.1 Non-ZLB
Monetary policy was instrumented with the Fed Funds rate until hitting the ZLB in the
aftermath of the 2007 − 2009 financial recession. It is important to compare the effect of
central bank credibility on forward guidance during the non-ZLB and ZLB time periods to
assess whether our findings are sensitive across subsamples. Thus, in this subsection, we
reestimate the model over the subsample 1981 : Q3− 2008 : Q4 and compare the results to
our benchmark outcomes.
The “Non-ZLB”column in Table 4 and Table 5 displays the results. Even during an era
where the interest rate does not bind at zero, our baseline result still holds. Specifically, the
value of τ is estimated to be 0.7765, which is about the same as our benchmark estimate of
0.7696. The values of the other parameters do not considerably change either. Therefore,
noticeable effects of forward guidance on the economy exist during the non-ZLB time period
as a high degree of Federal Reserve credibility is estimated to exist. However, the estimate
of τ still remains below the fully credible central bank scenario.
5.1.2 Great Moderation
Our full sample includes periods of relatively high volatility in the macroeconomic variables
(i.e., pre-1985) and to some extent from the 2007− 2009 financial recession onward. Hence,
it is also important to examine whether the effect of central bank credibility on forward
guidance is the same or not during a stable time period. Thus, this subsection compares
the benchmark estimation to the case in which we reestimate the model over the subsample
1985 : Q1 − 2007 : Q3. This period has been called the “Great Moderation” in which the
volatility in macroeconomic variables was relatively low (see, e.g., Clark (2009)).
The estimates of the structural and measurement error parameters of this exercise are
displayed in the “Great Moderation” column of Table 4 and Table 5. The results show
that the benchmark takeaway from Section 4 does not change. The estimate of our central
bank credibility parameter is 0.7798, which is very similar to our baseline value. Thus, there
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exists a high degree of central bank credibility in the U.S. during a stable economic era, which
provides further evidence that the effect of forward guidance appears largely unchanged over
time in our full sample. And, once again, confirms that τ̂ is below the fully credible central
bank case.
5.2 Alternative Macro Persistence Features
The VAR(1) framework that private agents who do not believe the monetary authority to
be credible utilize to construct forecasts involves inherent persistence in the macroeconomic
variables. Because of this model’s inertia in the macro variables, it is of interest to investigate
if the estimated credibility parameter is affected because of these features. Intuitively, the
hypothesis here is that perhaps the presence of macro inertia affects the relative advantages
of one forecasting model over the other and, in doing so, affects the estimate of τ . Thus, we
analyze the results when habits in consumption (η) and price indexation (ιp) are turned off
and compare it to the baseline outcomes.
The results shown in Table 6 and Table 7 provide further evidence that our estimate of τ
capturing central bank credibility in terms of forward guidance statements is quite robust to
alternative macro persistence features. First, when habits in consumption are shut off (i.e.,
η = 0), the results do not noticeably change. Under the “η = 0”column, Table 6 displays
that the estimate for τ is 0.7637, which is virtually identical to our benchmark estimate of
0.7696. The posterior mean estimates of the other parameters are largely the same as under
the benchmark τ̂ scenario in Table 1 and Table 2.
Second, when the degree of price indexation is turned off (i.e., ιp = 0), the posterior
estimates of the parameters are largely unchanged. In particular, the “ιp = 0”column in
Table 6 displays that the estimate of τ at 0.7789 is about the same as the benchmark case
of price indexation existing. Thus, since the central bank credibility parameter does not
seem to be reflecting a bias from lagged consumption or prices, the results of this subsection
provide more corroboration of the robustness of τ capturing monetary authority credibility
in terms of forward guidance.
5.3 Alternative Reduced-Form Forecasting Model
We also examine the estimation of the central bank credibility parameter τ under alternative
specifications of the forecasting models used by the private sector. The benchmark case
in Section 4 assumed private sector agents who believe the monetary authority to be not
credible formed expectations from a VAR(1) based on (25). However, private agents who
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believe the central bank followed FIRE expectations. However, a natural question arises
regarding whether the estimated value of τ depends on the information set in the forecasting
model of private sector agents?
Here, we examine the case when private agents that do not believe the central bank
know more about the true structure of the economy, that is, the case when not credible
expectations (Et
(
Y Dt+1
)
) become better informed. Private agents are assumed to know the
AR(1) shock realizations, that is, wt = [at, µt]
′
, when formulating their expectations of future
macroeconomic variables. Thus, equation (25) is replaced with:
Yt = A+BYt−1 + Cwt + et, (33)
where the A, B, and C are coeffi cient matrices of appropriate dimensions, and et is a vector
of white noise (non-structural) residual terms.
Table 8 and Table 9 produce two main takeaways. First, additional knowledge (or in-
formation) about the true structure of the economy seems to have minimal effect on the
posterior estimates of the parameters. In Table 8, the estimate of our central bank credi-
bility parameter is 0.7774. This previous value is approximately the same as our baseline
estimate of 0.7696.31 Thus, even if private agents utilize a forecasting model with more
information, the results do not substantially change. In particular, there still are noticeable
effects of forward guidance on the economy as private agents are estimated to believe the
Fed to be highly credible, but still below the fully credible case of τ = 1.
The second takeaway regards that, since the estimate of τ does not significantly change
when private agents are more informed, τ does not seem to be capturing private agents’lack
of knowledge about the true structure of the economy, that is, not knowing productivity
growth and cost-push shocks. Thus, because the value of τ does not seem to depend on
these other non-forward guidance elements, this latter result provides additional evidence
that τ reflects central bank credibility.
5.4 Alternative Priors on the Credibility Parameter
Our baseline prior assumption for τ assumed a high degree of central bank credibility. This
value seems reasonable and fits well with the Federal Reserve narrative. However, it is also
important to examine the results under a different light, that is, when we adopt a more
31Altogether Table 8 and Table 9 display that the estimates of the other parameters in the model do not
appreciably change.
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agnostic view about the prior value of τ . Here, we examine the results when the prior
distribution for τ changes to a Uniform distribution on the unit interval.
The outcomes of the estimation are displayed in Table 10 and Table 11. The results show
that the estimate for τ in this case is 0.6034, which is somewhat smaller than our benchmark
of 0.7696.32 However, the former estimate of τ is still relatively high and within range of
our benchmark estimate. Therefore, if one is agnostic about the true value of τ and adopts
a U (0, 1) prior distribution, there continues to exist effects of forward guidance on the U.S.
economy as the public largely believes the U.S. central bank to be credible. However, similar
to the benchmark results in Subsection 4.1, the estimated value of τ is still below the fully
credible case (i.e., τ = 1).33
5.5 Alternative Mapping of SPF Forecasts
Section 3 described the data and observables that we included for the estimation of our
model. In our benchmark analysis, we utilized the SPF nowcast for our model’s one-quarter
ahead expectations and so on. As explained in Subsection 3.2.1, we believe this assumption
made sense given the actual submission dates and timing of SPF forecasters. However, a
natural question can emerge. Specifically, what if SPF one-quarter ahead forecasts were used
to correspond with our model’s one-quarter ahead expectations instead of the nowcast?
This section performs a robustness check to analyze the results when the above possibility
32The estimates of the other parameters do not substantially change.
33A noticeable feature displayed in Table 10 and Table 11 is that the marginal likelihood is also higher
under a uniform prior distribution on τ than under the beta prior distribution assumed in our benchmark
(in Table 1 and Table 2). However, the estimate of the main parameter of interest, τ , is only somewhat
smaller than the benchmark indicating a still high degree of central bank credibility. And, needless to say,
the main results do not qualitatively change when utilizing an uninformative prior.
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is taken into account. The model’s observation equations are modified as follows:
gobst
πobst
iobst
Eobst (gt+1)
Eobst (gt+2)
Eobst (πt+1)
Eobst (it+1)
Eobst (it+2)
Eobst (it+3)
Eobst (it+4)

=

∆yt
πt
it
Et (∆yt+1)
Et (∆yt+2)
Et (πt+1)
Et (it+1)
Et (it+2)
Et (it+3)
Et (it+4)

+

γ̄g + γt
γ̄π
γ̄r
γ̄g
1
+ Et
(
γt+1
)
γ̄g
2
+ Et
(
γt+2
)
γ̄π
γ̄r
1
γ̄r
2
γ̄r
3
γ̄r
4

+
[
03×7
I7×7
]

o
gt+1
t
o
gt+2
t
o
πt+1
t
o
it+1
t
o
it+2
t
o
it+3
t
o
it+4
t

. (34)
Two differences are apparent between the observation equations in this section (i.e., equation
(34)) and the baseline observation equations (i.e., equation (27)). First, the t + 1 timing
in our model now corresponds to one-period ahead expectations in the SPF dataset. In
addition, Eobst (it+5) is not in equation (34). Since this exercise utilizes one-quarter ahead
SPF expectations (and not the nowcast) for t + 1 expectations in our model, we only have
data up to four-quarters ahead from the SPF. Table 12 and Table 13 display the estimated
values of the structural and measurement error parameters of this exercise.
The main takeaway is that the benchmark results are robust to the timing assumption
matching SPF forecasts to our model’s expectations. The estimated value of our parameter
of interest, τ , is 0.7761, which does not notably change relative to the benchmark value
reported in Section 4. In addition, the estimates of the other parameters do not considerably
change either. However, the value of the marginal likelihood is lower at 631.3625 compared
to 901.1813 from the baseline case. Since the marginal likelihood depends on the data,
the discrepancy could be due to this implementation using one less observable than that of
Section 4 as described in previous paragraph.
6 Conclusion
The aftermath of the 2007− 2009 financial recession caused central banks around the world
to more explicitly utilize monetary policy forward guidance as a policy tool. However, as
we show here, its effectiveness rests on the credibility of the central bank. Thus, this paper
examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with
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imperfect central bank credibility. We jointly model forward guidance and central bank
credibility, exploiting interest rate expectations and other macro forecasts from the SPF,
estimating credibility using Bayesian methods, and cross-validating the model in relation to
the forecasting predictability arising from disagreement found in the SPF dataset.
The results show important takeaways. First, the estimate of central bank credibility
in terms of forward guidance announcements is high for the Federal Reserve indicating a
degree of effectiveness of forward guidance on the U.S. economy (particularly for output
and less so for inflation). However, the estimated value is still below the fully credible case.
Consequently, when the central bank is perceived to be less than perfectly credible, there
exist less immediate and overall effects on the economy from forward guidance. Output and
inflation does not respond as favorably to forward guidance relative to the fully credible
case. Hence, we show that imperfect credibility is another feature that can contribute to
resolve– at least partially– the forward guidance puzzle.
Second, we provide (compelling) evidence that our model’s expectations framework re-
flects central bank credibility and aligns well with data. For instance, our model of imperfect
central bank credibility cross-validates well with SPF data on the predictability of forecasting
errors for the policy path. Furthermore, the results do not noticeably change when exam-
ining the following robustness scenarios: different sample periods, different assumptions on
macro persistence, different forecasting models for private sector agents, different priors on
the credibility parameter τ , and different timing assumptions regarding SPF forecasts.
Overall, we conclude that accounting for imperfect credibility is important to model
the formation of expectations in the economy and the transmission mechanism of forward
guidance announcements.
30
References
Adjemian, S., H. Bastani, M. Juillard, F. Mihoubi, G. Perendia, M. Ratto, and S. Villemot
(2011). Dynare: Reference Manual, Version 4. CEPREMAP. Dynare Working Papers
1. https://bit.ly/2Y3TdsW.
Andrade, P., G. Gaballo, E. Mengus, and B. Mojon (2019). Forward Guidance and
Heterogeneous Beliefs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11 (3), 1—29.
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180141.
Andrade, P. and H. Le Bihan (2013). Inatentive Professional Forecasters. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 60 (8), 967—982. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.08.005.
BIS (2019). Unconventional Monetary Policy Tools: A Cross-Country Analysis. Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) Papers No. 63 . Report prepared
by a Working Group chaired by Simon M Potter (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) and Frank Smets (European Central Bank). Bank for International Settlements.
https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs63.pdf.
Branch, W. A. and B. McGough (2009). A New Keynesian Model with Heteroge-
neous Expectations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (5), 1036—1051.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2008.11.007.
Calvo, G. A. (1983). Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework. Journal of
Monetary Economics 12 (3), 383—398. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90060-0.
Campbell, J. R., C. L. Evans, J. D. Fisher, and A. Justiniano (2012). Macroeconomic
Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance. Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity 2012 (1), 1—80. Project MUSE. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2012.0004.
Campbell, J. R., F. Ferroni, J. D. Fisher, and L. Melosi (2019). The Limits of Forward
Guidance. FRB of Chicago Working Paper 2019-03 . https://doi.org/10.21033/wp-
2019-03.
Carlstrom, C. T., T. S. Fuerst, and M. Paustian (2015). Inflation and Output in New
Keynesian Models With a Transient Interest Rate Peg. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 76 (November), 230—243. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.09.004.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005). Nominal Rigidities and the
Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 113 (1),
1—45. https://doi.org/10.1086/426038.
31
Clark, T. E. (2009). Is the Great Moderation Over? An Empirical Analysis. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (Fourth Quarter), 5—42.
https://bit.ly/35Kef29.
Coibion, O., , and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012). What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us
About Information Rigidities? Journal of Political Economy 120 (1), 116—159.
https://doi.org/10.1086/665662.
Coibion, O., , and Y. Gorodnichenko (2015). Information Rigidity and the Expectations
Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. American Economic Re-
view 105 (8), 2644—2678. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20110306.
Cole, S. J. (2020a). Learning and the Effectiveness of Central Bank Forward Guidance.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. https://bit.ly/2QWWCIl.
Cole, S. J. (2020b). The limits of Central Bank Forward Guidance Under Learning. Inter-
national Journal of Central Banking. https://bit.ly/2qI3nmP.
Cole, S. J. and F. Milani (2017). The Misspecification of Expectations in New Keyne-
sian Models: A DSGE-VAR Approach. Macroeconomic Dynamics 23 (3), 974—1007.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100517000104.
Contessi, S. and L. Li (2013). Forward Guidance 101A: A Roadmap of the U.S. Experience.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Synopses 25, 1—3. https://bit.ly/2OWafoz.
Czudaj, R. L. and J. Beckmann (2018). Monetary Policy Shocks, Expec-
tations, and Information Rigidities. Economic Inquiry 56 (4), 2158—2176.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12587.
Cúrdia, V., A. Ferrero, G. C. Ng, and A. Tambalotti (2015). Has U.S. Monetary Pol-
icy Tracked the Effi cient Interest Rate? Journal of Monetary Economics 70, 72—83.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.09.004.
De Graeve, F., P. Ilbas, and R. Wouters (2014). Forward Guidance and Long Term In-
terest Rates: Inspecting the Mechanism. Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper No. 292 .
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/129709.
Del Negro, M., M. P. Giannoni, and C. Patterson (2012). The Forward Guidance Puzzle.
FRB of New York Staff Report No. 574 . http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163750.
Dennis, R. (2004). Specifying and Estimating New Keynesian Models With Instrument
Rules and Optimal Monetary Policies. FRB of San Francisco Working Paper Series
2004-17 . https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2004-17.
32
Doehr, R. and E. Martínez-García (2015). Monetary Policy Expectations and Economic
Fl uctuations at the Zero Lower Bound. Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute
Working Paper no. 240 . https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp240.
Dong, B. and E. R. Young (2019). Forward Guidance and Credible Monetary Policy.
SSRN Working Paper No. 2685987 . http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685987.
Eggertsson, G. B. and M. Woodford (2003). The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Op-
timal Monetary Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003 (1), 139—211.
Project MUSE. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2003.0010.
Eusepi, S. and B. Preston (2010). Central Bank Communication and Expecta-
tions Stabilization. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (3), 235—271.
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.2.3.235.
Ferrero, G. and A. Secchi (2009). The Announcement of Monetary Policy Intentions. Temi
di discussione (Economic working papers) 720 . Bank of Italy, Economic Research and
International Relations Area. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1523254.
Ferrero, G. and A. Secchi (2010). Central Banks’ Macroeconomic Projections
and Learning. Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No.
782 . Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803168.
FRB of Philadelphia (2019). Survey of Professional Forecasters: Documentation. Last
Update: October 16, 2019 . https://bit.ly/37S2jgy.
Gaspar, V., F. Smets, and D. Vestin (2006). Adaptive Learning, Persistence, and Opti-
mal Monetary Policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (2-3), 376—385.
https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.376.
Gaspar, V., F. Smets, and D. Vestin (2010). Inflation Expectations, Adaptive Learning
and Optimal Monetary Policy. In B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford (Eds.), Hand-
book of Monetary Economics, Volume 3, Chapter 19, pp. 1055—1095. Elsevier B.V.
https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53454-5.00007-4.
Gauss, E. (2015). Adaptive Learning, Heterogeneous Expectations and Forward Guidance.
Technical Report, Mimeo. Ursinus College. https://bit.ly/2rBXzuT.
Giannoni, M. P. and M. Woodford (2004). Optimal Inflation-Targeting Rules. In B. S.
Bernanke and M. Woodford (Eds.), The Inflation-Targeting Debate, Chapter 3, pp.
93—172. Chicago: Chicago Scholarship Online.
33
Goodfriend, M. and R. G. King (2016). Review of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy 2010-
2015. Sveriges riksdag. https://data.riksdagen.se/dokument/RFR-201516-RFR7.pdf.
Goy, G., C. H. Hommes, and K. Mavromatis (2018). Forward Guidance and the Role of
Central Bank Credibility under Heterogeneous Beliefs. De Nederlandsche Bank Work-
ing Paper No. 614 . https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3296214.
Haberis, A., R. Harrison, and M. Waldron (2014). Transitory Interest-Rate
Pegs Under Imperfect Credibility. LSE Research Online Documents on Eco-
nomics 86335 . London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86335/.
Haberis, A., R. Harrison, and M. Waldron (2019). Uncertain Policy Promises. European
Economic Review 111, 459—474. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.003.
Hansen, L. and T. Sargent (1980). Formulating and Estimating Dynamic Linear Ratio-
nal Expectations Models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2 (1), 7—46.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(80)90049-4.
Honkapohja, S. and K. Mitra (2005). Performance of Inflation Targeting Based on Con-
stant Interest Rate Projections. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 29 (11),
1867—1892. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.06.006.
Honkapohja, S. and K. Mitra (2019). Price Level Targeting with Evolving Cred-
ibility. Journal of Monetary Economics. Available online 13 September 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.09.009.
Hubert, P. (2014). FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 46 (7), 1381—1420. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12142.
Hubert, P. (2015a). Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting
Performance Versus Signals. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 47 (4), 771—789.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12227.
Hubert, P. (2015b). The Influence and Policy Signalling Role of FOMC
Forecasts. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 77 (5), 655—680.
https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12093.
Kiley, M. T. (2016). Policy Paradoxes in the New Keynesian Model. Review of Economic
Dynamics 21 (July), 1—15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2016.03.002.
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsis-
tency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85 (3), 473—492. June.
34
Laséen, S. and L. E. O. Svensson (2011). Anticipated Alternative Policy Rate
Paths in Policy Simulations. International Journal of Central Banking 7 (3), 1—35.
https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb11q3a1.htm.
Lindsey, D. E. (2003). A Modern History of FOMC Communication: 1975-2002. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Memorandum. https://bit.ly/2OvZz10.
Martínez-García, E. (2018). Modeling Time-Variation Over the Business Cycle (1960-
2017): An International Perspective. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Economet-
rics 22 (5), 1—25. https://doi.org/10.1515/snde-2017-0101.
McKay, A., E. Nakamura, and J. Steinsson (2016). The Power of For-
ward Guidance Revisited. American Economic Review 106 (10), 3133—3158.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150063.
Milani, F. (2007). Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Per-
sistence. Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (7), 2065—2082.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.11.007.
Nakata, T. and T. Sunakawa (2019). Credible Forward Guidance. Finance and Economics
Discussion Series 2019-037 . Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2019.037.
Orphanides, A. and J. C. Williams (2004). Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations,
and Monetary Policy. In B. S. Bernanke and M. Woodford (Eds.), The Inflation-
Targeting Debate, Chapter 5, pp. 201—245. Chicago: Chicago Scholarship Online.
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226044736.001.0001.
Orphanides, A. and J. C. Williams (2007). Robust Monetary Policy With
Imperfect Knowledge. Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (5), 1406—1435.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.06.005.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press.
Park, K. (2018). Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy. Economic Research In-
stitute Working Paper 2018-45 . Bank of Korea. https://bit.ly/2rDaXPm.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2012). What’s News in Business Cycles. Economet-
rica 80 (6), 2733—2764. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8050.
Sims, C. A. (2002). Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models. Computational Eco-
nomics 20 (1), 1—20. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020517101123.
35
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007). Shocks and Frictions in U.S. Business Cy-
cles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach. American Economic Review 97 (3), 586—606.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.586.
Swanson, E. T. (2018). The Federal Reserve Is Not Very Constrained by the Lower Bound
on Nominal Interest Rates. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2018 (2), 555—572.
Project MUSE. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2018.0015.
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195—214. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-
2231(93)90009-l.
Williams, J. C. (2013). Will Unconventional Policy Be The New Normal? FRBSF Eco-
nomic Letter 2013-29 . https://bit.ly/2P328Xx.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices. Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Woodford, M. (2005). Central-Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness. Proceedings
- Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
‘The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future’. https://doi.org/10.3386/w11898.
Wynne, M. A. (2013). A Short History of FOMC Communication. Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas Economic Letter 8, 1—4. https://bit.ly/33yRuwO.
Yun, T. (1996). Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business Cy-
cles. Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (2), 345—370. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-
3932(96)90040-9.
36
7 Appendix. An Evolutionary Game of Central Bank
Credibility
The private sector chooses between two different pure-strategies that affect how they form
their expectations about the future– either they believe the central bank will honor its for-
ward guidance commitments (C) or they disregard the promises that come from announce-
ments about the future path of monetary policy and make forecasts solely on the basis of
observable data (D). Similarly, the central bank concerns itself with two pure strategies–
either to honor its commitments and deliver on the announced policy (C) or to renege from
the existing commitments (D).
Conventionally, the literature on forward guidance has assumed the strategy pair (C,C)
holds accepting that such an outcome could be sustained in equilibrium. Indeed, there
are conditions on the payoffs of each player that would indeed support such an outcome
as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). However, without a payoff-based disciplining
mechanism to sustain the strategy pair (C,C) in equilibrium, we must consider the broad
range of plausible strategic implications of the non-cooperative (evolutionary) game that can
arise between the central bank and the private sector.34
The general form of the central bank credibility game. We proceed by describing
the credibility game between the central bank and private agents in general terms. The
(evolutionary) game between the central bank and private agents consists of:
1. Two players referred as the central bank (cb) and the private sector (pa), i.e., M =
{cb, pa}.
2. A strategy set Si for each player i ∈M with two pure strategies which are to comply
(C) or to deviate (D), i.e., Si = {C,D} for each i ∈M .
3. A linear payoff function ui : Si → R, assigned to each player i ∈ M , which can be
written in matrix form as ui (si) = Zisi ∈ R for any payoff matrix Zi and strategy si ∈ Si,
for each player i ∈M .
We define the strategy space of the game as S = Πi∈MSi where each strategy pair is pin
down as s = (spa, scb) ∈ S. Denoting si ∈ Si the strategy of player i ∈M and the strategy of
the other player as s−i := (sj) ∈ S−i = Πj∈M,j 6=iSj where j 6= i and i, j ∈ M , it follows that
the strategy pair can be rewritten as s := (si, s−i) ∈ Si × S−i = S = Πi∈MSi for all i ∈ M .
34In other words, there are payoffs (like in the well-known “game of chicken”) where a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists and is evolutionarily stable which supports the notion that there is some degree of imperfect
central bank credibility.
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From here, we define a best response for a given player in the following general terms:
Definition 1 A strategy ŝi ∈ Si is called a best response to strategy s−i ∈ S−i iff ui (ŝi, s−i) ≥
ui (si, s−i), ∀i ∈M , ∀si ∈ Si.
If every player chooses its best response, then no other strategy can increase the player’s
payoff. Hence, all players following their best response strategies constitutes a Nash equilib-
rium defined as follows:
Definition 2 A pair of strategies s∗ ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium iff ui (s∗) = ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
≥
ui
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
, ∀i ∈M , ∀si ∈ Si.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy pair in the game that is a best response for both players
simultaneously so no player can benefit from switching to play another alternative strategy.
In other words, if player i ∈M were to choose the alternative strategy si 6= s∗i where si ∈ Si
instead of the strategy s∗i receives a payoff ui
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
≤ ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
, i.e., s∗i does just as good
or better than any other alternative strategy. However, a Nash equilibrium allows for the
possibility that some alternative strategy may achieve the same payoff, i.e., there may be
some si ∈ Si for which ui
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
= ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
. In turn, an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) is a strategy that supports a stable solution that has the stronger property that, if the
strategy is followed, no player who adopts a novel strategy can hope to successfully displace
the ESS strategy. More precisely, a ESS strategy can be defined in the following terms:
Definition 3 A strategy sESSi ∈ Si for each i ∈ M is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
if: either (a) ui
(
sESSi , s
ESS
−i
)
> ui
(
si, s
ESS
−i
)
, ∀si ∈ Si and si 6= sESSi ; or (b) ui
(
sESSi , s
ESS
−i
)
=
ui
(
si, s
ESS
−i
)
and ui
(
sESSi , s−i
)
> ui (si, s−i), ∀ (si, s−i) ∈ S and si 6= sESSi and s−i 6= sESS−i .
The ESS concept is an equilibrium refinement to the Nash equilibrium. What this means
is that a strategy pair
(
sESSi , s
ESS
−i
)
describes an ESS strategy for each player if: (a) the
ESS strategy does strictly better than any alternative would do while playing against ESS;
or (b) some alternative strategy does as well as ESS playing against ESS but ESS still
does strictly better playing against the alternative strategy than it would do playing the
alternative strategy against itself.
The linear payoff function ui : {C,D} × {C,D} → R for both players (the central bank
and the private sector) and two strategies (Comply or Deviate) can be described in normal
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form with the following payoff matrix:
Private Agents
C D
Central
C Rcb, Rpa Lcb, Tpa
Bank
D Tcb, Lpa Pcb, Ppa
To comply (C) means to commit to honor the policy announcements on the part of the
central bank and to accept the credibility of such commitments on the part of the private
agents, while to deviate (D) means to renege on the policy announcements and to rely on a
forecasting model not containing policy announcements (e.g., equation (25)) to negate any
credibility to such announcements respectively.
We assume that the payoff for the private sector and the central bank is tied to the social
welfare achieved. R refers to the reward or social welfare that both players achieve jointly
by each choosing C. If the two players deviate then each receives P which is the punishment
payoff (the sub-optimal social welfare) that they achieve jointly by each choosing D. In our
context, the social welfare that can be achieved when both players deviate is lower than if
both comply, i.e., P > R.
When one player complies and the other deviates, T is the temptation payoff that the
player that deviates (D) receives while L is the loser payoff received by the player that
complies (C). In our context, the player that deviates (or cheats) in this game benefits at
the expense of the player that complies, i.e., the social welfare perceived by the player that
is cheated is lower than that of the cheater such that Li < Ti, ∀i ∈M .
For expositional tractability, we assume that the temptation and loser payoffs are sym-
metric for both players, i.e., Li = L and Ti = T , ∀i ∈ M . Similarly, the reward and
punishment values are also symmetric for both players, i.e., Ri = R and Pi = P , ∀i ∈ M .
Given the symmetric payoff matrix that we describe here, the linear payoff function can be
written in matrix form as ui (si) = Zisi ∈ R for any strategy si ∈ Si and for each player
i ∈M with Zi = Z =
[
R L
T P
]
.
Now, depending on the ordering of R, T , L, and P , we can have significantly different
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games with different equilibrium outcomes. A well-known game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
requires the ordering to be T > R > P > L. We consider however two other orderings
that stand out as most relevant for the interaction between the central bank and the private
sector: the Game of Chicken which requires T > R > L > P and the Trust Dilemma that
requires instead that R > T > L > P .
Replicator dynamics. Let us consider pj (t) the frequency with which pure strategy
j = {C,D} is played and p (t) = (pC (t) , pD (t))T the corresponding state vector, where t
denotes the t-th replication of the same game. We postulate a law of motion for p (t) that
describes how the dynamics of the game evolve as players consider future generations (or
replications) of the game at play. If players engage in a symmetric game with the payoff
matrix Z, then (Zp (t))j is the expected payoff for strategy j = {C,D} and
(
p (t)T Zp (t)
)
is the average payoff. Thus, the relative performance of the frequency vector pj (t) for each
strategy j = {C,D} is given by (Zp(t))j
p(t)TZp(t)
if p (t)T Zp (t) 6= 0.
We assume that the frequency pj (t) for each strategy j = {C,D} is iteratively updated
proportionally to its relative performance, i.e.,
pj (t+ ∆t)
pj (t)
=
(Zp (t))j
p (t)T Zp (t)
∆t, (35)
for ∆t > 0 and for all j = {C,D}. Hence, pj (t+ ∆t) − pj (t) = pj (t)
(Zp(t))j−p(t)
TZp(t)
p(t)TZp(t)
∆t.
This, in turn, yields the following differential equation as ∆t→ 0:
·
pj = pj
(Zp)j − pTZp
pTZp
, (36)
for all j = {C,D} with ·pj denoting the derivative of pj (t) with respect to t.
A solution qj (t) to the simplified differential equation:
·
qj = qj
[
(Zq)j − qTZq
]
, (37)
suffi ces to describe the replicator dynamics of the game as (36) has the same trajectories as
(37). That is because, according to the transformation of t given by t (s) =
∫ s
s0
p (t)T Zp (t)
with s0 being the initial iteration, every solution pj (t) of (36) delivers a solution qj (s) :=
pj (t (s)) of the simplified differential equation (37).
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Evolutionary stable strategies. Let us denote the frequency of strategy D with the
parameter q and the frequency of strategy C as 1 − q with q̃ = (1− q, q)T . The replicator
equation in (37) has two terms that depend on the payoffmatrix Z. The first term depends
on Zq̃ which gives us that
(
(1− q)R + qL
(1− q)T + qP
)
. Since strategy D is ordered after C in the
layout of the normal form of the game, we use the second component of Zq̃ to describe (Zq̃)j
when j = D. The second term q̃TZq̃ can be expressed as (1− q)2R+(1− q) q (L+ T )+q2P .
Thus, the replicator equation in (37) for strategy D is given by:
·
q = q
[
(1− q)T + qP − (1− q)2R− (1− q) q (L+ T )− q2P
]
. (38)
By setting
·
q = 0, i.e., by solving the equation:
q
[
T −R− (L− P + 2 (T −R)) q + (L− P + T −R) q2
]
= 0, (39)
we obtain the evolutionary states of the model. This holds trivially true for qES = 0 and
for qES = 1. The mixed strategy solution can be pin down by factoring the roots from the
quadratic function q2 −
(
L−P+2(T−R)
L−P+T−R
)
q +
(
T−R
L−P+T−R
)
= 0 where we already know that one
of the roots is qES = 1. From that, we obtain that that the mixed strategy state of the
model is qES =
(
1
1+L−P
T−R
)
.
To sum up:
Lemma 1 The central bank credibility game has generically three states. Two states are in
pure strategies where qES = 0 implies playing C and qES = 1 implies playing D. The mixed
strategy state, if one exists, involves playing strategy D with a frequency of qES =
(
1
1+L−P
T−R
)
and strategy C with a frequency of 1− qES =
(
L−P
T−R
1+L−P
T−R
)
.
The mixed strategy state is well-defined and satisfies 0 ≤
(
1
1+L−P
T−R
)
≤ 1 whenever
(L− P ) + (T −R) ≥ 0 and L−P
T−R ≥ 0. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, as indicated before, requires
the ordering to be T > R > P > L. Therefore, T − R > 0 and L − P < 0 violates the
condition that L−P
T−R ≥ 0 and for this case there are only two states based on pure strategies.
Similarly, the Trust Dilemma that imposes instead that R > T > L > P implies that
L − P > 0 and T − R < 0. Therefore, for the Trust Dilemma, there are only two states
in pure strategies as well. In turn, the Game of Chicken which requires T > R > L > P
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implies that L−P > 0 and T −R > 0 and satisfies the conditions that insure a well-defined
mixed strategy state exists.
Definition 4 A strategy pair
(
1− qESS, qESS
)T
is said to be an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) if it’s a locally convergent evolutionary state which is dynamically restored after a
disturbance via the replicator equation in (37), provided the disturbance is not too large.
That is, qES = 0 is an ESS if
·
q < 0 for q0 (> 0)→ 0 from the right and qES = 1 is an ESS
if
·
q > 0 for q0 (< 1) → 1 from the left. In turn, qES =
(
1
1+L−P
T−R
)
is an ESS if
·
q < 0 for
q0
(
> 1
1+L−P
T−R
)
→ 1
1+L−P
T−R
from the right and
·
q > 0 for q0
(
< 1
1+L−P
T−R
)
→ 1
1+L−P
T−R
from the left.
When we explore the dynamics implied by the replicator equation in (37), it follows that
given the orderings of the payoffs R, T , L, and P :
Proposition 1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has one ESS only, that is the state qESS =
qES = 1 (which implies the player follows the pure strategy D). Similarly, the Trust Dilemma
has one ESS only that corresponds to the other pure strategy qESS = qES = 0 (the player
follows the pure strategy C). In turn, the only ESS of the central bank credibility game
(the Game of Chicken between the central bank and the private sector) is the mixed strategy
implied by qESS = qES =
(
1
1+L−P
T−R
)
.
When we estimate our model with central bank credibility and forward guidance in
Section 4, the data favor a mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, Proposition 1 suggests that
the Game of Chicken is better suited than the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Trust Dilemma to
describe the central bank credibility game. In other words, the Game of Chicken where a
mixed strategy equilibrium exists and is evolutionarily stable can support the notion that
there is some degree of imperfect central bank credibility that we detect in the U.S. data.
We leave for future research the tasks of relaxing the symmetry of the payoffmatrix used
here for exposition and of incorporating those payoffs and dynamic learning via the replicator
dynamics in our model estimation. That would help us endogenize the equilibrium credibility
parameter and introduce learning in our framework.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Structural Parameters
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Perfectly Credible C.B. Not Perfectly Credible C.B.
(τ = 1) (τ̂)
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
τ B(0.80, 0.01) - - - 0.7696 0.7524 0.7865
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9709 0.8881 1.0520 0.9954 0.9124 1.0770
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.8817 0.8601 0.9039 0.9669 0.9538 0.9801
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.3276 1.1816 1.4745 1.4951 1.3329 1.6589
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.0722 0.0415 0.1023 0.1331 0.0506 0.2146
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.0660 0.0190 0.1110 0.6785 0.5434 0.8156
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.9908 0.9862 0.9954 0.4987 0.4777 0.5200
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.5037 0.4314 0.5786 0.0270 0.0030 0.0509
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0752 0.0639 0.0866 0.6026 0.5424 0.6623
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1058 0.0896 0.1215 0.1327 0.1189 0.1467
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1858 0.1669 0.2042 0.1916 0.1716 0.2110
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0748 0.0642 0.0855 0.0686 0.0579 0.0790
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0402 0.0356 0.0442 0.0492 0.0416 0.0565
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0387 0.0356 0.0418 0.0412 0.0359 0.0456
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0402 0.0356 0.0439 0.0424 0.0365 0.0476
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0610 0.0479 0.0738 0.0585 0.0464 0.0707
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0595 0.0470 0.0717 0.0584 0.0460 0.0702
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0584 0.0461 0.0705 0.0587 0.0461 0.0708
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0583 0.0461 0.0700 0.0584 0.0462 0.0707
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0581 0.0459 0.0698 0.0583 0.0462 0.0706
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0583 0.0461 0.0704 0.0583 0.0460 0.0701
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0588 0.0464 0.0709 0.0584 0.0461 0.0703
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0594 0.0468 0.0718 0.0585 0.0460 0.0706
logMargL 599.0789 901.1813
Note: C.B.: Central Bank, G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta
Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 2: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Measurement Errors
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Perfectly Credible C.B. Not Perfectly Credible C.B.
(τ = 1) (τ̂)
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.4504 0.4059 0.4942 0.3424 0.3088 0.3753
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.4500 0.4029 0.4960 0.1928 0.1737 0.2115
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1668 0.1496 0.1834 0.1619 0.1457 0.1775
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0327 0.0252 0.0403 0.0291 0.0232 0.0348
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0179 0.0146 0.0211 0.0170 0.0139 0.0199
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0153 0.0128 0.0178 0.0146 0.0124 0.0168
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0157 0.0130 0.0183 0.0161 0.0132 0.0188
σmei5 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0209 0.0162 0.0252 0.0212 0.0166 0.0256
logMargL 599.0789 901.1813
Note: C.B.: Central Bank, G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta
Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition Upon Impact
Perfectly Credible C.B. Not Perfectly Credible C.B.
(τ = 1) (τ̂)
Output Inflation Interest Rate Output Inflation Interest Rate
εMPt 30.3333 0.4965 95.5377 83.2219 0.0028 99.6743
εγt 44.7020 12.7346 0.9890 0.0126 0.0039 0.0013
εµt 1.8289 85.4111 3.2918 9.2308 99.9928 0.3243
εFG1,t 5.2008 0.0994 0.0245 6.3791 0.0003 0.0000
εFG2,t 1.4658 0.0344 0.0075 1.0200 0.0001 0.0000
εFG3,t 1.2690 0.0371 0.0072 0.1185 0.0000 0.0000
εFG4,t 1.2507 0.0455 0.0079 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000
εFG5,t 2.6102 0.1169 0.0182 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000
εFG6,t 2.2434 0.1226 0.0174 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000
εFG7,t 1.9449 0.1283 0.0167 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000
εFG8,t 1.7389 0.1370 0.0165 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
εFG9,t 1.5523 0.1449 0.0163 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
εFG10,t 1.4022 0.1538 0.0163 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
εFG11,t 1.2829 0.1640 0.0164 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
εFG12,t 1.1746 0.1740 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total FG 23.1357 1.3579 0.1814 7.5346 0.0004 0.0000
Note: This table computes the conditional variance decomposition upon impact of the
structural and forward guidance shocks with parameter values at their posterior mean.
Each column displays the percentage contribution of each shock to model-implied output
and observables (inflation and interest rates). Total FG denotes the sum of all of the for-
ward guidance shocks. The measurement errors are not shown as their contribution con-
cerns expected values of observables.
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Table 4: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Structural Parameters under 
Subsamples
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Non-ZLB Great Moderation
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
τ B(0.80, 0.01) 0.7765 0.7592 0.7935 0.7798 0.7620 0.7975
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9972 0.9142 1.0785 0.9977 0.9155 1.0803
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.9527 0.9354 0.9696 0.9535 0.9316 0.9761
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.4911 1.3269 1.6525 1.4996 1.3372 1.6626
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.1356 0.0518 0.2169 0.1336 0.0520 0.2141
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.6536 0.5099 0.8012 0.4032 0.2332 0.5787
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.4944 0.4664 0.5223 0.4216 0.3514 0.4933
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.0364 0.0039 0.0677 0.0795 0.0077 0.1518
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.6490 0.5729 0.7224 0.5547 0.4734 0.6357
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1305 0.1145 0.1462 0.1241 0.1073 0.1409
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.2191 0.1929 0.2449 0.1443 0.1251 0.1632
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0773 0.0636 0.0907 0.0636 0.0513 0.0758
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0554 0.0458 0.0648 0.0554 0.0457 0.0650
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0457 0.0387 0.0523 0.0446 0.0373 0.0513
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0467 0.0392 0.0537 0.0421 0.0357 0.0472
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0653 0.0503 0.0802 0.0691 0.0520 0.0857
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0653 0.0500 0.0801 0.0693 0.0518 0.0862
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0649 0.0499 0.0796 0.0691 0.0521 0.0859
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0654 0.0497 0.0803 0.0690 0.0517 0.0857
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0652 0.0501 0.0800 0.0692 0.0519 0.0859
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0653 0.0500 0.0801 0.0689 0.0521 0.0855
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0650 0.0498 0.0797 0.0691 0.0519 0.0858
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0651 0.0500 0.0797 0.0691 0.0522 0.0859
logMargL 587.7405 601.7465
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uni-
form Distribution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 5: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Measurement Errors under 
Subsamples
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Non-ZLB Great Moderation
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.3329 0.2959 0.3706 0.2892 0.2532 0.3249
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.2018 0.1788 0.2241 0.1763 0.1534 0.1985
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1698 0.1502 0.1885 0.1657 0.1450 0.1862
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0327 0.0251 0.0401 0.0360 0.0285 0.0435
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0190 0.0152 0.0228 0.0178 0.0143 0.0213
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0166 0.0136 0.0196 0.0172 0.0138 0.0204
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0181 0.0146 0.0215 0.0177 0.0141 0.0212
σmei5 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0234 0.0178 0.0288 0.0208 0.0161 0.0254
logMargL 587.7405 601.7465
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uni-
form Distribution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 6: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Structural Parameters Without Frictions
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
No Habit Formation in Consumption No Price Indexation
(η = 0) (ιp = 0)
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
τ B(0.80, 0.01) 0.7637 0.7476 0.7795 0.7789 0.7621 0.7960
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9898 0.9074 1.0722 0.9982 0.9151 1.0791
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.9621 0.9492 0.9753 0.9667 0.9534 0.9799
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.4973 1.3322 1.6581 1.4955 1.3356 1.6582
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.1442 0.0627 0.2257 0.1320 0.0501 0.2147
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.6819 0.5503 0.8128 - - -
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.1267 0.0506 0.1993 0.4972 0.4741 0.5207
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.0277 0.0035 0.0513 0.7498 0.6525 0.8495
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.7043 0.6114 0.7971 0.6031 0.5430 0.6632
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1385 0.1242 0.1526 0.0767 0.0637 0.0891
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1944 0.1741 0.2141 0.1919 0.1718 0.2119
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0671 0.0565 0.0776 0.0684 0.0577 0.0790
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0507 0.0430 0.0584 0.0484 0.0410 0.0555
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0427 0.0369 0.0481 0.0408 0.0356 0.0449
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0437 0.0373 0.0496 0.0421 0.0365 0.0472
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0601 0.0471 0.0728 0.0584 0.0463 0.0703
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0596 0.0468 0.0721 0.0583 0.0460 0.0702
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0592 0.0466 0.0714 0.0581 0.0459 0.0699
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0588 0.0462 0.0707 0.0583 0.0461 0.0701
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0587 0.0465 0.0709 0.0582 0.0461 0.0701
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0587 0.0464 0.0708 0.0583 0.0463 0.0704
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0587 0.0466 0.0708 0.0583 0.0462 0.0702
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0590 0.0465 0.0713 0.0582 0.0463 0.0702
logMargL 635.9700 890.6997
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distri-
bution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
48
Table 7: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Measurement Errors Without Frictions
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
No Habit Formation in Consumption No Price Indexation
(η = 0) (ιp = 0)
Distr. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.8504 0.7684 0.9318 0.3455 0.3118 0.3790
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.2608 0.2343 0.2867 0.1936 0.1741 0.2124
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1660 0.1493 0.1821 0.1756 0.1581 0.1928
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0306 0.0248 0.0363 0.0294 0.0236 0.0351
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0172 0.0141 0.0202 0.0169 0.0139 0.0198
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0154 0.0128 0.0179 0.0147 0.0123 0.0168
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0178 0.0145 0.0210 0.0161 0.0133 0.0189
σmei5 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0216 0.0169 0.0261 0.0211 0.0166 0.0256
logMargL 635.9700 890.6997
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribution, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Dis-
tribution, IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 8: Prior & Posterior Estimates of 
Struc-tural Parameters with Alternative 
Non-Credible Expectations
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
τ B(0.80, 0.01) 0.7774 0.7606 0.7943
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9971 0.9148 1.0790
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.9791 0.9689 0.9896
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.4945 1.3300 1.6575
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.1291 0.0472 0.2120
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.7114 0.5849 0.8460
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.4687 0.4334 0.5046
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.0299 0.0035 0.0557
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.6007 0.5410 0.6606
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1406 0.1240 0.1566
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1919 0.1720 0.2107
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0701 0.0610 0.0786
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0437 0.0376 0.0495
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0393 0.0356 0.0427
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0388 0.0356 0.0421
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0580 0.0460 0.0699
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0578 0.0459 0.0695
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0578 0.0459 0.0695
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0580 0.0459 0.0700
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0580 0.0459 0.0695
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0580 0.0460 0.0700
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0581 0.0459 0.0700
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0578 0.0457 0.0697
logMargL 928.8763
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution, IG:
Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 9: Prior & Posterior Estimates of 
Mea-surement Errors with Alternative 
Non-Credible Expectations
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.3387 0.3051 0.3717
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1880 0.1695 0.2064
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1563 0.1401 0.1721
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0199 0.0158 0.0238
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0156 0.0130 0.0182
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0141 0.0119 0.0159
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0150 0.0126 0.0174
σmei5 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0188 0.0151 0.0224
logMargL 928.8763
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution,
IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 10: Prior & Posterior Estimates of
Structural Parameters under U(0,1) Prior on
τ
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
τ U(0, 1) 0.6034 0.5684 0.6389
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9976 0.9149 1.0792
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.9755 0.9632 0.9882
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.5192 1.3585 1.6846
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.1263 0.0448 0.2067
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.5843 0.3912 0.7793
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.4945 0.4794 0.5096
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.0379 0.0047 0.0701
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.6016 0.5426 0.6598
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1441 0.1279 0.1601
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.2039 0.1820 0.2257
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0835 0.0687 0.0984
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0631 0.0522 0.0739
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0478 0.0404 0.0551
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0507 0.0421 0.0589
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0604 0.0474 0.0732
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0605 0.0475 0.0733
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0605 0.0475 0.0734
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0604 0.0474 0.0732
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0604 0.0476 0.0731
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0604 0.0473 0.0730
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0605 0.0474 0.0732
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0605 0.0473 0.0731
logMargL 928.4596
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution, IG:
Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 11: Prior & Posterior Estimates of Mea-
surement Errors under U(0,1) Prior on τ
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.3401 0.3070 0.3731
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1923 0.1732 0.2110
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1517 0.1368 0.1662
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0254 0.0202 0.0306
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0173 0.0142 0.0203
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0147 0.0124 0.0169
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0167 0.0138 0.0196
σmei5 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0230 0.0178 0.0282
logMargL 928.4596
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution,
IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 12: Prior & Posterior Estimates of
Structural Parameters under Alternative
SPF Timing
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
τ B(0.8, 0.01) 0.7761 0.7588 0.7936
ω N(1.00, 0.05) 0.9930 0.9120 1.0753
ρ B(0.75, 0.10) 0.9525 0.9363 0.9687
χπ N(1.50, 0.10) 1.4874 1.3264 1.6482
χx N(0.125, 0.05) 0.1374 0.0574 0.2172
ιp B(0.50, 0.15) 0.6806 0.5445 0.8186
ργ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.3784 0.3233 0.4353
ρµ B(0.50, 0.20) 0.0313 0.0037 0.0579
σγ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.7045 0.6197 0.7882
σµ IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1362 0.1217 0.1501
σMP IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.1931 0.1734 0.2131
σFG1 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0898 0.0785 0.1010
σFG2 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0447 0.0382 0.0510
σFG3 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0412 0.0357 0.0456
σFG4 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0621 0.0481 0.0755
σFG5 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0620 0.0483 0.0754
σFG6 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0617 0.0483 0.0751
σFG7 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0618 0.0481 0.0752
σFG8 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0619 0.0481 0.0753
σFG9 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0617 0.0480 0.0748
σFG10 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0619 0.0481 0.0753
σFG11 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0618 0.0482 0.0750
σFG12 IG(0.30, 2.00) 0.0618 0.0483 0.0755
logMargL 631.3625
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution, IG:
Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Table 13: Prior & Posterior Estimates of
Measurement Errors under Alternative SPF
Timing
Prior Distr. Posterior Distribution
Distr. Mean 5% 95%
σmeg1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.3189 0.2874 0.3501
σmeg2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1859 0.1666 0.2050
σmeπ1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.1818 0.1637 0.1993
σmei1 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0204 0.0160 0.0247
σmei2 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0153 0.0127 0.0177
σmei3 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0153 0.0127 0.0178
σmei4 IG(0.10, 2.00) 0.0204 0.0161 0.0247
logMargL 631.3625
Note: G: Gamma Distribution, N: Normal Distribu-
tion, B: Beta Distribution, U: Uniform Distribution,
IG: Inverse-Gamma Distribution.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions. Mean response of model-implied output and ob-
servables (inflation and interest rate) to one-period ahead forward guidance and four-period
ahead forward guidance shocks. Solid Line: Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., τ = 1). Dashed
line: Not Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., Benchmark τ̂). C.B.: Central Bank.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions. Mean response of model-implied output and observ-
ables (inflation and interest rate) to eight-period ahead forward guidance and twelve-period
ahead forward guidance shocks. Solid Line: Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., τ = 1). Dashed
line: Not Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., Benchmark τ̂). C.B.: Central Bank.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions. Mean response of model-implied output and ob-
servables (inflation and interest rate) to productivity growth, cost-push, and unanticipated
monetary policy shocks. Solid Line: Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., τ = 1). Dashed line: Not
Perfectly Credible C.B. (i.e., Benchmark τ̂). C.B.: Central Bank.
58
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Nowcast T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4
Range of Simulated
Estimates
Actual Estimates Based on
SPF (1981:Q3-2018:Q4)
Actual Estimates Based on
SPF (1981:Q3-2008:Q4)
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.5
Estimates of Forecasting Errors Response to Forecasting Disagreement
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) vs. Simulated Data
NOTE: Forecasting errors are computed with respect to the mean forecast with SPF data from 1981:Q3 till 2018:Q4 (150 observations). Forecasting 
disagreements are measured with the interquartile range of the cross-sectional distribution of individual forecasts in order to make the results less 
sensitive in the presence of outliers. We regress forecasting erros on an intercept and this measure of forecasting disagreement for all available time 
horizons. We perform the same exercise on a rolling window of 150 observations from a simulated sample data of 2000 observations. We represent 
the full range of rolling window estimates with a box-and-whisker plot that show their min, max, median, and interquartile range.
SOURCES: Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), simulated data, author's calculations.
Fi ure 4: Estimates of Forecasti g Error Response Forecasting Disag eem nt, Survey of
P fessional Forecast r (SPF) vs. Simulat d Data
Note: Forecasting errors are computed with respect to the mean forecast with SPF
data from 1981:Q3 until 2018:Q4 (150 observations). Forecasting disagreements are mea-
sured with the interquartile range of the cross-sectional distribution of individual forecasts
in order to make the empirical results less sensitive to outliers. We regress forecasting errors
on an intercept and this measure of forecasting disagreement for all available time horizons.
We perform the same exercise on a rolling window of 150 observations from a simulated
sample data of 2000 observations under τ̂ . We represent the full range of rolling window
estimates with a box-and-whisker plot that show their min, max, median, and interquartile
range. SOURCES: Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), simulated data, author’s
calculations.
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